Could current police governance structures and culture constitute a risk to the safe and sustainable delivery of the Volunteer police Cadets in England and Wales

UP 837859

April 2019

DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGY AND ENTERPRISE
UNIVERSITY OF PORTSMOUTH
BUSINESS SCHOOL
MSc RISK, CRISIS AND RESILIENCE MANAGEMENT

Business School

Title: Are police processes and culture affect the safe delivery of the Volunteer Police Cadets

Author: Edward Sherry OBE

Tutor: Dr Sara Hadleigh-Dunn (Thorne) FHEA, FSyI

Year of submission: 2019

Word Count: **15,882**

Signed statement of originality: *This project is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science. I, the undersigned declare that this project report is my own original work. Where I have taken ideas and or wording from another source, this is explicitly referenced in the text.*

1st April 2019

Signed………………………

Permission for inter-library loan: *I give permission that this report may be photocopied and made available for inter-library loan for the purpose of research*

Signed …………………… 1st April 2019

Abstract

Since 2012, The Volunteer Police Cadets (VPC) in England in Wales have operated under a common framework which views the VPC as a youth outreach programme rather that a recruiting tool for the police. Each of the 43 police forces hold responsibly for the management and risk associated with their VPC, supported by a small national team that provide limited infrastructure including basic adult training, curriculum and an IT management system. Recent research (DeMarco, Bifulco & Davidson 2018) highlighted that some VPC leaders felt they were not receiving the support and oversight required when running a uniformed youth group. This exploratory research saw a series of 15 semi- structured interviews take place across 5 police forces in early 2019. The aim was to explore the views of the strategic and operational leads, together with groups of VPC leaders to seek a deeper understanding of the issues that the police forces face when delivering the VPC and seek to identify if the current situation could be contributing to the onset of the incubation period of disaster as identified by Turner (1978)

Table of contents

List of tables and charts

List of appendices

Could current police governance structures and culture constitute a risk to the safe and sustainable delivery of the Volunteer police Cadets in England and Wales

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out the background to the Volunteer Police Cadets and context in which this research is undertaken. The aims and objectives will be set out and an explanation outlined as to the research methodology employed.

1.2 Background to the Volunteer Police Cadets

In 2012, the Police Chiefs of the forty-three police forces in England and Wales adopted an agreed Volunteer Police Cadet (VPC) framework that viewed the VPC as a youth outreach programme, rather than a recruiting exercise for the police (ACPO 2012, p. 5). This programme was aimed at young people aged between 13 and 18 years with the following four stated aims.

- Promote a practical understanding of policing amongst all young people
- Encourage the spirit of adventure and good citizenship
- Support local policing priorities through volunteering and give young people a chance to be heard
- Inspire young people to participate positively in their communities

Since that time the VPC has grown dramatically, and following a recommendation by the All Party Parliamentary Group for Children (APPG 2014 p.25), the age range was expanded, so that by 2018 there were over 15,000 young people involved in the VPC,

starting at the age of 8 years with Mini Police, through Junior VPC and then VPC (vpc.police.uk).

By the spring of 2018, the VPC had evolved from being a highly successful police intervention programme into the UK Police's nationally recognised Uniformed Youth Group, in a similar vein to military cadets and the Scout Association (YUF website) both of who have long standing and engrained infrastructure and governance processes.

When, in 2012, the Police Chiefs agreed a framework for the VPC, a small National coordination team was established to support police forces to set up and deliver their VPC, however it was decided that the governance and delivery of the VPC was to be the responsibility of the local police force, who also held the risk for their VPC. The National coordination team provides infrastructure, which includes an IT system, a curriculum and basic training for adult leaders, but the day to day running of the VPC remained the responsibility of the local force who also held the risk for all their VPC activity.

1.3 Current VPC operational delivery model

When compared to the other recognised uniformed youth groups in the UK, the VPC is still relativity small with both the Scouts and Girl Guiding having approximately 500,000 young people in each organisation and the combined military cadet schemes having a total of approximately 126,000 young people (Ministry of Defence 2016). All these voluntary organisations have substantial and long-established volunteer based infrastructures to support them. The cost to the Ministry of Defence in providing the infrastructure for the military cadet schemes each year is estimated to be £179.15 million (UK Parliament 2017), which is almost as much as the entire budget of a

medium size police force like Nottinghamshire, who had an annual budget of £198 million for 2017/18 (Nottinghamshire Police and Crime Commissioner 2018)

When adult volunteering roles within the Scouts and Girl Guiding are reviewed, the ratio of support roles to delivery roles averages out at approximately 4.6 support roles for every role that is involved with the direct delivery of the programme to young people; as set out in Figure 1.

Organisation	Direct delivery roles	Support roles	Total volunteer roles	Ratio of support roles to delivery roles
Scouts	14	60	74	4.3 : 1
Girl Guiding	7	36	43	3 : 1

Fig. 1. Ratio of support roles to delivery roles within Scouts and Girl Guiding

The support roles within these organisations are concerned with the infrastructure of the organisation that support the delivery of the core offer to young people and covers all aspects of business that any organisation would expect to have fulfilled including, financial management, safeguarding, recruitment, training, retention of the adult volunteers and providing governance throughout the organisation. (Girl Guiding & Scouts website)

1.4 Issues identified in the delivery of VPC

As each police force introduced and then increased the capacity of their VPC, the majority developed a variety of governance frameworks and risk management

processes that utilised their existing, hierarchal police systems. Although this practical solution was a sensible and pragmatic approach to take when the VPC was in it's infancy, the rapid expansion of the VPC has taken place at a time when the police forces in England and Wales have seen a 19% decrease in budgets between 2010/11 and 2018/19 (National Audit Office, *2018 p.5)* and recent evidence (DeMarco, Bifulco & Davidson, 2018) suggested that these processes may not be appropriate for the long term management of a uniformed youth group.

1.5 The impact of police culture

Significant research has been undertaken in relation to police culture, Banton (1964), Westley (1970), Cain (1973), Rubinstein (1973), Reiner (1978), Punch (1979), Holdaway (1983), Chan (2003), Loftus (2010), Cockcroft (2013). Reiner (1978), in his book The Politics of the Police (1978), Reiner identified four underpinning principles on which police culture is built, namely '*Mission, action, pessimism and cynicism*' (Reiner 2010 p. 119) with officers viewing their roles as catching criminals and protect the weak and divide policing in 'hard' and 'soft' roles. (Reiner 2010) & Loftus (2010).

DeMarco, Bifulco, Davidson suggest that the activities of the VPC are viewed as 'soft' policing and not worthy of too much attention with leaders feeling that the police view it as:

> '*a "soft job", not meriting the time or attention of more pressing matters'.* (DeMarco, et al. 2108 p. 28).

1.6 Potential similarities to findings of The Laming Report 2002

The Laming report (2002) examined the failings of the statutory authorities in the run up to the death of Victoria Climbie who died at the hands of her carers in 2000. Among it's many findings, it highlighted the culture within the police towards the Child Protection Teams (CPTs), whose role was to work with other statutory authorities and families of young people to ensure that the chances of risk of harm were reduced. Lord Laming stated that it was his view that 'the police' viewed the role of the CPTs to be *'soft'* policing who were referred to *'in a derogatory way such as "cardigan squads"(p. 334)'* and who received little management support or oversight

'*The system of supervision…. was totally ineffective'* (p. 324).

1.7 Specific area of the research

Within the VPC, almost all the support infrastructure is delivered through police processes and recent evidence from leaders who deliver the VPC on a regular basis would suggest that the level of support, oversight and governance afforded adult leaders and volunteers in other uniformed youth groups is not afforded them.

'*…..belief that those already in non-police constable roles (e.g. Police Volunteers, Police and Community Support Officers) were often left to carry units'* (DeMarco et al., 2018 p.28)

and they conclude,

'*Without endorsement (from management), many (Leaders)… perceived the sustainability of units to be under threat*' (DeMarco et al., 2108 p. 28).

This lack of endorsement and support is not unique to the VPC or new to policing, Gaston, K. and Alexander, J. (2001) undertook research into the views of special constables and identified common concern of those that had withdrawn from the scheme, noting

'*the numbers that thought they were… undervalued should give cause for concern.*" (p. 96).

DeMarco et al., conclude their research;

'*The police at the operational and political level need to see the importance of managing and operating cadet units within their local communities*' (2108 p. 28)

1.8 The VPC and the incubation period of disasters

It is suggested that this situation outlined by DeMarco et al, could mask the potential for the onset of the 'incubation period of a disaster' as set out by Turner's Man Made Disasters (1978). In his research, Turner identified similarities across high profile disasters in engineering and high-risk industries and since that time many frameworks have been to developed to assist organisations to maintain risk management standards and avert the possibility of sliding into the incubation period. These include the Iinternational Organization for Standardization (ISO) and within the charitable sector National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NVCO).

1.9 Aim of the research

The aim of this research project is to build on the findings of DeMarco et al (2108) and examine the un-researched area of the police management structures involved in the delivery of the VPC and how effective these are at managing the risks faced when running their volunteer uniform youth group. As the VPC is delivered on a day-to-day basis by a mixture of police officers, staff and community volunteers, it aims to develop a deeper understanding of the current situation faced by these VPC leaders and attempt to identify any underlying cultural and management issues that may be affecting the safe and effective delivery of programme.

Specific aims of this research are:

- To identity the current issues faced in delivering the VPC

- Seek to identify if the current delivery model of the VPC could be leading to the onset of the incubation period of disaster (Turner, 1978)

Objectives to support these aims:

- Explore the views expressed by VPC leaders and structural issues identified by DeMarco et al (2018)
-
- To identify if police processes and culture could be a contributing factor to the identified risks.

- To identify similarities to the situation within the child protection teams in the run up to the death of Victoria Climbie. (Laming report 2002).

- Highlight potential frameworks which could assist in the safe management of

  the VPC

1.11   Organisation of dissertation

This dissertation is divided into the following five chapters.

Chapter 2: Sets out a structured literature review pertaining to the VPC, volunteering within the police, police culture and the identification of potential recognised risk management processes that could assist police forces to focus attention on the risks that they face when running the VPC.

Chapter 3: Outline the chosen methodological approach taken in obtaining an analysing the data.

Chapter 4: Analyses and discusses the research finding, seeking common themes between those in different t roles.

Chapter 5:, will reviews the findings against the stated aims and discuss the implications for future research.

The appendices contain all supporting documents and additional tables referred to in this dissertation.

Chapter 2. Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will examine existing research in the areas relating to this research. First the existing research related to the VPC will be examined which will be developed to include research into other areas of volunteering within the police. The issue of police culture will then be examined followed by high level review of findings from the Victoria Climbie report by Lord Laming (2002) and complete with a summary of some industry standard risk management frameworks that could be utilised to ensure the VPC is delivered in a safe manner.

2.2 Previous research relating to the Volunteer Police Cadets

There is very limited research relating to the VPC and the research that does exist focused on the benefits of the programme to police relationships with young people and the developmental benefit for the young people, DeMarco (2015), Pepper and Silvestri (2016). In 2018, DeMarco, Bifulco, Davidson (2108), as part of a larger piece of research relating to the value of the VPC, conducted 15 interviews with VPC leaders across 5 polices forces and found the VPC offered a '*safe and secure environment'* (p. 7) however several leaders felt safeguarding mechanisms were '*risk adverse'* and there was significant amount of '*red tape'* (p. 22). A specific area highlighted during this research was the perceived lack of structure and support from 'the police' with request from VPC leaders for more structure, resources and high-level leadership.' (p. 28)

Demarco et al make several recommendations including the need for police:

'*at the operational and political level need to see the importance of*

Although helpful at highlighting these issues raised by the VPC leaders, these findings do little to reveal the underlying causes for why the views expressed by the leaders may be held.

2.3 The VPC as part of the larger police volunteering programmes

The VPC makes up the third arm of three main, police led, volunteering schemes with the most established and embedded being the Special Constabulary (Specials), who are volunteers with the full powers of a police constable, (Bullock, 2017, p 354). The other volunteering arm is the Police Support Volunteers programme (PSV), which began in the mid 1990s and who are best described as 'auxiliaries' undertaking functions that do not require police powers (Bullock, 2017, p. 344). Together with the VPC, these programmes have over 35,000 volunteers and make up the main elements of the England and Wales, Citizens in Policing Strategy (National Police Chief Council, 2016).

The recognition of a lack of management, structure and support, for the VPC identified by Demarco et al. (2018) would appear to be present in the other volunteer programmes. In a similar manner to the management of the VPC, police forces are responsible for the management of their own PSVs which has meant they have grown in an organic manner, without central oversight, a situation recognised by a Public Sector worker's union report.

'(police) forces are more or less free to develop their own volunteer programmes, for better, or for worse.' (Unison, 2014, p, 5).

This approach has led to issues within the management of the PSV programmes with evidence that they the situation can be problematic

'... (it is) becoming clear that the processes of coordinating, managing and supervising volunteers within constabularies..... are not straightforward ones…the best ways of managing and supporting them, needs consideration at the central and local levels'. (Bullock 2017 p. 149)

The long term implications of the these issues was highlighted by Britton(2016)

'…all that commitment and investment may be undermined by limitations in the evidence-base…., and limited sharing and learning around best practice across forces.' (p. 6)

2.4 Previous research relating to Police Culture

Research into modern policing culture began in the 1950s (Reiner 2011 p. 67) and from that time it has evolved and become more complex, Cockcroft (2013), Chan (2003), Banton, (1964), Skolnick (1966), Westley (1970), Cain (1973), Rubinstein (1973), Reiner (1978), Punch (1979), Holdaway (1983), Smith and Gray (1985), Young (1991), Loftus (2010 with many of these researchers found similar characteristics within police culture. Reiner (1985), 'The Politics of the Police' is cited by many, including Bowling, B. & Sheptyckib, J (2015), as a key work in the development of academic research relating to police culture. In 1985 Reiner encapsulated police culture as based on suspicion, solidarity and crime fighting with underlying themes of

'*Mission, Action, cynicism and pessimism*' (Reiner 2011, p. 119).

This view was countered by Paoline (2003) who reviewed previous research into police culture and came to the conclusion that the one size fits all, 'monolithic' police culture that had previously been identified, may be an over simplistic view. He suggests that changes to policing over the preceding 25 years and issues of rank, location and role should be considered when assessing the culture (p. 210).

With a view to identifying if the culture had changed in the intervening years, Loftus (2010) undertook fieldwork with operational police officers. His findings reinforced the previous findings of Reiner (1987), with officers still viewing their roles as catching criminals and seeking excitement.

'*They celebrate masculine exploits, show willingness to use force and engage in informal working practices*' (2010 p. 1).

These informal working practices, Loftus described as, '*occupational deviance*' (2010 p. 13) with officers assisting each other with unauthorized activities, without informing supervisors.

Research carried out in America appears to balance the findings of Loftus (2010) and Paoline (2003). Phillips, Terrell-Orr (2013) examined the views of 400 police supervisors in American Police Forces relating to the use of volunteers in policing. Their findings would seem to support those of Paoline (2003) as they found that many police supervisors were open to involvement of volunteers in community policing 'soft' roles which they suggest is a divergence from the hard policing, crime fighting culture previously identified. The validity of these finding could be challenged as the research was undertaken at Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy where the

participants were on professional development course, away from their normal places of work and surrounding influences.

These themes were further explored by Brough P., Chataway, S., Biggs, A. (2016) who investigated the culture identified by 42 warranted police officers in Queensland, Australia. Although they identified small changes in the prevailing police culture relating to a reduction in a hard drinking culture and the increased scrutiny of the police, they identified contemporary police organisational culture characteristics were still present and identified that roles that required a higher degree of mental and physical toughness e.g. the Special Emergency Response Squad were highly regarded whereas traffic officers were deemed to not be engaged in *'real police work (p. 33).*

2.5 Similarities between Demarco et al (2018) and Lord Laming (2002)

The identified issues of not 'real' police work. Brough et al (2016) and the VPC being viewed as 'soft' policing identified by DeMarco et al (2018) could, it is suggested, resonate with many of the police related failings identified in The Laming Report (2002). This report examined the failing of police and other statutory bodies into the events that led up to the death of Victoria Climbie who was killed by her carers in 2000.

Among many failings, the report identified failing related to the management and operational delivery of the Police Child Protection Teams (CPT). In the report Lord Laming identified this issue when a senior officer stated:

'*there was a significant amount of "macho nonsense" ...concerning the work*

of CPTs,… referred to in a derogatory way such as "cardigan squads"' (p. 335).

The officers themselves viewed themselves as the '*poor cousins*' or '*Cinderellas*' of the force, (p. 349) who received no training or appropriate resources to undertake their role. There was an identified lack of supervision and no strategic oversight.

'*The system of supervision…. was totally ineffective*'. (p. 384)

Lord Laming was also damning in his criticism of the strategic leaders:

> '…*senior police officers presided over (CPTs)…, which lacked proper management systems and where overworked front-line staff were left to muddle through as best they could, sometimes making grave mistakes which were never identified and corrected*' (p. 324).

He also made comment as to the long term effects that this lack of supervision had on the officers and staff delivering the service:

> '*I believe it would be wrong to discount the corrosive effect that a long period of neglect and under-resourcing can have on the morale and effectiveness of a team like Haringey CPT*. (p. 309).

2.6 Police Culture definition for the purpose of this research project

It is accepted that the concept of police culture is both dynamic and complex (Paoline 2003), however for the purpose of this exploratory research the following aspects of the police culture will be used to map against the findings of the research:

- "mission, action, pessimism and cynicism" - Renier (2010)

- 'Real' policing v 'soft' policing - Brough, et al (2016) Demarco, et al (2018)

- 'Occupational deviance' – Loftus (2010)

2.7 Identifying and managing risk in other youth organisations

In his book Man Made Disasters (1978) Turner examined the events that led to several significant disasters within engineering and high risk industries. His finding led to the development of his 6 stage 'Incubation of Disaster' Model. Stage is defined as the '*the notionally normal starting point of the system*' when an agreed '*initial culturally accepted beliefs*' are adopted (1978, p72). For the purposes of this research it would be assumed that is would be the introduction of the VPC in 2012 (NPCC 2012) when the agreed operating framework was adopted by the polcie forces

The second stage of Turner's theory is the '*The Incubation Period*' (1997. p72), described by Turner, as *'the accumulation of an unnoticed set of events which are at odds with the accepted beliefs about hazards and the norms for their avoidance.'* (1997, p.P72). He then goes onto describe the 3rd stage as precipitating event   *'that bring attention to itself and transforms general perceptions of stage 2'.* (1997 p.72) Stages 4 to 6 then deal with the disaster itself and the process of a return to normalisation'.

Although this theory is slighted dated, it is argued here that it provided the foundations for many of the current risk management frameworks.

All of the other uniformed youth originations in the UK have some form of charitable status and are therefore required to maintain governance and risk management levels as governed by the Charity Commission regulations (Charity Commission UK website). There are many supporting framework offered to support charities to ensure they maintain governance standards and manage risk appropriately. An well defined framework is National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NVCO), Trusted Charity Framework (NCVO), website).

This framework set outs 11 standards that must be met to obtain accrediting to the agreed standard, covering areas of governance, leadership and management process and aims to prevent the charities from slipping into the Incubation Period of a disaster (Turner 1997 p. 72). This framework will not be examined in detail in this research but will form a section of the conclusion and recommendations.

Chapter 3.   Research Methodology

3.1   Introduction

In this chapter the research methodology adopted for this research project will be outlined. Firstly, the research design and methods will be discussed and justified. Then the process of identifying participating forces and the participants themselves will be outlined followed by an outlined of the process for managing the data. Ethical issues will then be considered, before the limitations of the research are outlined, and issues of reliability and validity will be clarified.

3.2   Research Methodology

As there is little in the way of previously identified research into the issues raised within this research project, an inductive approach was adopted. Collis & Hussey describe this approach; '*theory is developed from the observation of empirical reality*' (2014, p 7.) Exploratory, qualitative research was undertaken by conducting a series of semi structured interviews within 5 police forces in England and Wales to gather the views of a mix of people involved in the delivery of and strategic oversight of the VPC.

The aim was to explore the issues identified by DeMarco et al (2018) to gain a deeper understanding of how those involved in the VPC view the current management and governance arrangements and how they identify and dealt with risk. This approach is described by Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, as a '*Critical realism*' (2007, p 105). When viewed through Burrell and Morgans (1979) '*four paradigms for the analysis of social theory*' it was set in the '*interpretive paradigm*' quadrant in that the purpose of this research project is to '*understand the fundamental meaning attached to organisational*

life' of the VPC within the police force, whether that be '*rational or irrational'*. Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, (2013, pp. 112-113). Burrell and Morgan describe a paradigm as;

'*way of looking at something that represents an established standard, a set of related ideas'*. (2007, p. 101)

Consideration was given to conducting a mixed method approach to this research, with the additional use of questionnaire. Brannen (1992) argues that mixed method research, combining both quantitative and qualitative approaches, allows the researcher an opportunity to explore both the macro-structural ways of understanding an issue as well as the micro-structural approaches. Saunders et al (2016) outline the benefits of the use of questionnaires as it allows the researcher to obtain a number of responses to a set of pre-defined questions, set by the researcher (p. 439). Although useful when there is clear set of questions to be answered (Saunders 2016 p. 439), it was felt that as there was no previous research in this area, it would be difficult to articulate a relevant question set, which could result in a distorted view of the issues that were being investigated. As a result, this mixed method approach was considered but ultimately rejected.

Bryman (2016) identifies several researchers who make claims as to the correct number of interviews required for any research to be conclusive. He cites, amongst others, Warren (2002), Greson & Horowitiz (2002), Manson (2010) Alder & Alder (2012) who collectively state an optimum sample size range, from between 12 and 150. (p.

416). Bryman concludes that the decision is a balancing act, citing Onwugbuzie & Collins (2007) who state;

'*sample sizes….should not be too small as to make it difficult to achieve data saturation (*no new insights are being discovered*)…. At the same time, the sample should not be so large that it is difficult to undertake a deep, case orientated analysis'* ([Onwugbuzie & Collins 2007] cited by Bryman 2016 p. 489)

When deciding sample size, Saunders et al (2007, p. 211) take a pragmatic view to sample size when they state that the most the important consideration is that the '*represents various voic*es' are heard. With this in mind, the following process of selecting the participants was undertaken.

3.3   The 5 police forces chosen to undertake the research

There are forty-three Home Office police forces in England and Wales, each headed by a Chief Constable and overseen by an elected Police and Crime Commissioner. As the VPC is active in all but one of the 43 police forces, it was important to ensure that an appropriate representative sample was achieved. Bryman (2016 p. 416) acknowledges the difficulty in achieving the correct sample size, citing Guest et al (2006) who recognised the difficulty in identifying when theoretical saturation is achieved.

In this study an attempt was been made to ensure a wide range of voices were heard by utilising the Home Office 'Most Similar Group' framework. The 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales are grouped into Most Similar Groups (MSG) by Her

Majesty's Inspectors of Constabularies & Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS). These grouping are based on the analysis of demographic, social and economic characteristics which relate to crime (HMICFRS.gov.uk). This MSG list was updated in June 2018 utilising census data from 2011 and provides a framework that can be used to judge the performance of police forces when compared to identified similar forces.

It is worth noting that each police force has its own unique MSG; so, it does not necessarily follow that if Devon and Cornwall Police were to be matched in Greater Manchester's police's MSG then this would be reciprocated. This situation makes it particularly difficult to obtain a cross section of views from within MSGs as there is no overarching grouping of forces, so the ability to ensure the voice of all police forces is represented in a study sample was challenging. A full list of Police Force MSGs is attached at Appendix 2.

This process identified 6 police forces within which to undertake the research. The choice of the 6 forces ensured that at least 40 of the 43 Police Forces were either within the identified MSG of the selected police forces, or the selected police force was present in the non-selected Force's MSG.

It is acknowledged that it would technically be possible to replicate this process of identifying the police forces taking part in this research. Saunders et al (2016) discuss the need for confidentially and anonymity before conducting research with organisations, especially when dealing with issues that may prove sensitive (p. 235). As it was unclear what would be uncovered during the research, it was decided that a layer of anonymity would be added to the Police Force selection process. Once

agreement had been obtained to approach the forces, one police force was randomly 'dropped' before the interviews were undertaken thereby providing an extra level of anonymity, while still ensuring that a wide variety of views could be expressed.

3.4 The process of engagement with the police forces

Bryman (2016, p. 142) identifies the need to ensure 'gatekeepers' are aware of the research and give informed consent. As the police is a hierarchical organisation, it was felt important that the correct chain of command was followed to ensure that the police, nationally and at force level, were aware of the research. As it was important to balance ethical issues of anonymity of the participants, the following a structured process was set out.

Stage 1

Authority was obtained from The National Police Chief Council portfolio lead for the VPC who sent an 'e'letter of introduction to the six Chiefs Constables of identified police forces, along with copy of the information sheet (Appendix 3), setting out the background and purpose of the research.

Stage 2

Once authority had been obtained from the appropriate Chief Constable, direct contact was made with the force level strategic lead seeking their support in taking part in the research and support in making contact with the operational lead.

Stage 3

Contact was them made with the operational lead who was asked to take part in the research and to disrupt the 'e'letter of introduction and supporting information sheet (appendix 3) to all VPC leaders in the police force.

Stage 4

The VPC leaders were asked to make direct contact with the researcher as this would ensure they felt no duty or obligation to take part.

In reality, the following occurred. After the introduction was made to the strategic lead, they forwarded the email to the operational lead, requesting that they organise the mechanics of the interviews on behalf of the force. Although the initial process was robust, it is accepted that just by the very nature of subject matter and the relationships between the various roles, there were weaknesses in the process, so it was important to reinforce the voluntary nature of participation at each step of the process to ensure informed consent was given. (Myers 2019 p. 50).

3.5 The choice of participants

With a view to gathering a deep understanding of the issues faced when delivering the VPC, a variety of roles were identified and interviews conducted with the police force level strategic lead for the VPC, the operational lead who oversee the VPC across the police force and groups of VPC leaders. This led to total of 15 interviews across the 5 police forces

- **The Strategic lead for the VPC within the Police Force**.

The strategic leads were a mixture of officers and staff ranging from Assistance Chief Constable to Superintendent or police staff equivalents. They all had significant and extensive portfolios, with the VPC making up only a very small part of their work.

- **The Operational lead for the force**

This group had oversight of the day to day delivery of the VPC across the police force area. The operational leads ranged from Community Support officer through to Inspector. Three of the operational leads had the VPC as their only portfolio while the other two had significant additional workloads with the VPC making up a minor part of their activity.

- **VPC Leaders**

The leadership teams within individual VPC units is made up of a mixture of police officers, community support officers, police staff and local volunteers and attempts were made to ensure all views were heard. In total 31 participants were involved in the five group interviews and were a mixture of police officers, staff and volunteers. The size of the leader interview groups varied from 12 down to just 1 leader, with an average of 6.2 leaders per interview group as set out below

Fig. 2: VPC Group interview participants

3.6   The structure of the interviews

All interviews took place during January and early February 2019 and all but one of the interviews were conducted face to face, the other being conducted over the telephone. All the interviews were audio recorded and although the aim was to keep the interviews to a maximum of 40 minutes, at least one went over the one hour mark.   Bryan (2016) outline the benefits of audio recording, noting that it is helpful for ensuring a true record is made of the interview, while allowing the interview to flow in a natural manner. It also assists the researcher to recollect details of the interview, capturing the nuances of the manner in which statements are made (p. 479).   Bryman also highlights that the use of recording equipment can be off putting for some participants, especially if controversial issues are discussed (p. 480). With this mind, all interviewees were reminded of the process of ensuring anonymity immediately before the interviews took place and asked to confirm that they agreed for the interview to be audio recorded. At the end of each interview, the participants were provided with an outline of next stages

of the process, including the storage of data and an offer was made to send each a summary of the eventual findings and thanked for their time and efforts.

3.7 The interviews

Strategic and operational leads

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with both the strategic and operational lead. Bryman (2016 p. 692) and Myers, (2013, p. 122) suggest that this type of interview be guided by the production of an interview guide which consists of a list of questions that ensures a level of consistency across the interviews, shape the conversation while allow flexibility, depending on how the interview progress and this approach was adopted in this research. A copy of the interview guide is attached at Appendix 4.

VPC leaders

Groups interviews were held with VPC leaders who run the VPC on a day-to-day basis. Myers, M. (2013, p. 123), identifies this as an effective approach as it allows the interviewer to obtain a collective view on a defined area, allowing the participants '*an opportunity to engage in thoughtful discussion*'. This approach allowed the leaders, who are normally community volunteers or staff of lower ranks than the police managers to speak as a collective voice. Myers (2104, p. 123) acknowledges the research of Klieber (2004) who identified groups of between seven and twelve participants were the optimum size for the group interviews to be effective. This principle was followed in this research and a maximum of 12 participants. As it transpired, there was never any need to select leaders as the maximum number that volunteered to participate in each interview group was 12. Myers (2013) identified the importance of setting the tone of the group interviews to ensure the participants go

beyond their private thoughts and to articulate their opinions while Saunders et al (2016) explain the need for the researcher to act as a facilitator of the conversation and ensure dominant characters do not dominate the conversations. A copy of the interview guide is attached at Appendix 5.

3.8   Post interview process

As the interviews were completed, the digital recordings were transferred onto a password protected IT system and the original recordings were destroyed. All interviews were then transcribed verbatim and the resulting data analysed using a structured approach, without the use of computer software.

3.9   Analysis of the data

Following the interviews within one force, the contents of the interview were reviewed, and an initial coding system developed that was then mapped across the remaining interviews. Myres (2013) describes coding as;

'attaching key words or tags to segments of text to permit later retrieval'

Myers (2013) goes on to describe the benefits of coding is that it is the beginning of the analytical process and assists in reducing the amount of data that requires analysis and for the purpose of this research, descriptive or (open) codes were utilised (p. 167-8). The initial coding and the resulting mapping are set out in Figure 3.

Coding	Strategic leads	Operational leads	Leaders	Total
Police Culture	69	67	40	176
Force governance	84	66	131	281
Attempts at self-governance	25	37	21	83
Positive leadership	13	10	7	30
Lack of leadership	12	23	13	48
Police specific oversight	0*	67	191	258
Desire to improve	31	42	57	130
Reluctance to change	0*	12	0	12
Lip service	0*	2	7	9
Safeguarding	23	48	64	135
Informal practices	6	26	53	85
Confusion over role	0*	34	53	87
Frustration	0*	59	223	282
Soft policing	4	14	38	56
Negative view of volunteers	14	23	12	49
Positive view of volunteers	27	14	23	64
Total	308	544	933	1785

*No specific attempt to code was made

Fig 3. Result of initial coding of all interviews

After analysing the results of this initial coding process for all the interviews, it was decided that the findings for the strategic and operational leads provided sufficient detail for the purposes of this research, however further refinement of the data was required for the VPC leaders.

Further refinement of the VPC leader data.

The coding set out in Fig. 3 were then transferred to a new coding set that was focused specifically on the recurring themes that were raised by the leaders. A rule was set that each appropriate statement made by the participants would be awarded 2 points which would be divided equally between 2 of the most appropriate new code classifications as set out in column 1 of Fig. 4 This process resulted in 1562 data points being identified.

This process of refinement was repeated a further 2 times, with the two columns that were considered to be least relevant removed and the data points that were held within the deleted sections, transferred to the most appropriate remaining category. At the end of the process there were still 1562 data points, evidence that all data was transferred across each part of the process.

2nd refinement of leader coding	3rd refinement of leader coding	Final refinement of leader coding	Coding of police activity identified- Lord Laming's report
Lack of HQ support	Lack of HQ support	Lack of HQ support	Lack of HQ support
Lack of local support	Lack of local support	Lack of local support	Lack of local support
Lack of recognised standards	Lack of recognised standards	Lack of recognised standards	Lack of recognised standards

Be part of National prog	Be part of National prog	Removed	Removed
Resources and people	Resources and people	Resources and people	Resources and people
lack of clarity of roles	lack of clarity of roles	lack of clarity of roles	lack of clarity of roles
Frustration at processes	Frustration at processes	Frustration at processes	Frustration at processes
Unauthorized activities	Unauthorized activities	Unauthorized activities	Unauthorized activities
Police culture recognised	Removed	Removed	Removed
Adult training	Adult training	Adult training	Adult training
S/guarding	S/guarding	S/guarding	S/guarding
Leader holds the risk	Removed	Removed	Removed
Local ill-informed decisions	Local ill-informed decisions	Removed	Removed

Fig 4. Refinement process of VPC leaders' responses

3.10 Comparison between finding and Laming Report (2002))

The final process within this research project was to utilise the coding structure used in this research and attempt to map them findings outlined in the Laming Laming which related to police failings in the run up to the death of Victoria Climbie. This process resulted in 178 data points and although the majority of the issues mapped across without issue, it is worth noting some rules that were placed on this process as set out in Fig 5.

Research coding	Mapping to Lord Laming 2002
Lack of HQ support	Any issue relating high level governance or structural management issues

Lack of local support	Any issues that related to local supervision or support
Frustration at processes	Any statement of disbelief, exasperation, or frustration eg 'there needed to be…,' 'this is, frankly'…, 'in my view.'

Fig 5. Adjustments to coding for Laming Report (2002)

3.11   Mapping current state against industry standards

As previously stated in chapter 2, the other uniformed youth groups in England and Wales operate within the charitable sector and as such are required to meet the standards set by the Charity Commission. In this research, once all data had been analysed, the current state of governance and delivery of the VPC was mapped against the NCVO Trusted Charity framework (NCVO website), Appendix 6. There are 11 standards within this framework and 8 which are appropriate to this research were used to assess the current position, .

3.12 Ethical considerations

The ethics policy of the university of Portsmouth was followed throughout this research, however it should be noted that the researcher has a significant paid role within the VPC, working directly to the Chief Constable portfolio lead for the VPC. Myers (2103) describes ethics as:

'the moral principles governing or influencing conduct' (p. 252)

Although this was helpful in gaining access to the gatekeepers within the police forces, Saunders et al (2016) outline the need to ensure that as a 'insider' to the organisation

that no undue pressures are placed on participants to corporate with the research (p. 249) and checklist for ensuring that these issues are dealt with (p. 251). This checklist includes the need to ensure that participants have not been coerced into taking part, no inducements have been made, that all potential risks to participants have been considered and ensuring that all participants have been made aware of their right to withdraw from the research at any time. To ensure that these issues were reinforced, the points were outlined in the Participant Information Sheet, Appendix 3 and again at the start of each interview where they were included at the top of each interview plan, Appendix 4 & 5.

Chapter 4   Findings

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will set outline the finding from the 10 semi structured interviews and 5 group interviews that took place within the research. It will start with an overview of the current management arrangements in the forces. It will then examine the responses from the Strategic and Operational Leads, before going on to review the findings from VPC leaders.

A review of the coding of data from the VPC leader group interviews will then be outlined and the chapter will conclude with a comparison of these findings with a coding exercise that examined the police failings outlined in The Laming Report (2002) which dealt with the death of Vitoria Climbie.

In relation to statements reproduced in these findings, the following abbreviations will be used to designate the role of the person responding:

Strategic lead –   SL

Operational Lead-   OL

VPC leader-   L

Researcher   R

4.2   The setup of VPC within the Police Forces

All five police forces have developed operational structures that are directed from the Police Force Headquarters (HQ), with a variety of resources provided in support of this central HQ function. Each force had a Strategic Lead who oversaw the 'Citizens in Policing' portfolio and in 4 of the 5 forces, this strategic lead had the 'Citizens in

Policing' portfolio and therefor the VPC, as part of a much larger and diverse portfolio of business areas.

The common operating framework across all the forces saw the operational Lead for the VPC being a member of a larger HQ team, who had responsibility for the Force's, 'Citizens in Policing' portfolio, dealing with other police related volunteering programme like the Police Support Volunteers (PSVs) and Special Constabulary (specials). The role of the operational lead varied across the forces, but it was generally recognised that there was a need for them to provide, a consistent structure, along with guidance and support for the VPC leaders:

'*I think you need central coordination and consistency and I'm absolutely clear that's the right way to be. And my experience of policing, if I had 3 or 10 of them, I'd have 3 or 10 different things running in different ways.*' [SL5]

It was acknowledged by another strategic lead that this issues of consistency of delivery was an ongoing issue:

'*...problem is that we've got (number) fiefdoms. No matter what I do to make it corporate, there are (number) of them*' [SL4]

The operational delivery and quality of individual VPC units was predominantly delegated to geographical leads who, depending on the force and level of delegation, could range from a Chief Superintendent to Sergeant with responsibly for the local policing area. This approach appeared to cause issues with local police support for the

individual VPC units being dependant on the views and commitment of the geographical lead:

> '*the inspector who was given the job (locally) as part of many of his other jobs, just didn't have the time or inclination to do it..... so it all just falls by the wayside.*' [SL4]

Throughout the interviews there was significant evidence of a desire to ensure the delivery of the VPC was conducted in a safe manner for the young people and an acknowledgement of the need for strong policies and strategies to manage risk:

> '*I think there's less a risk when you've got such a strong strategy, policy, governance than if you were a force that had none of that.*' [SL2]

It was acknowledged by many of the participants that the VPC was still relatively new and there was still a need to learn and develop.

> '*So where are we in our maturity, I'd like to think we're safe, I'd like to think we've got a good understanding of what's happening and what we do. But actually, we're two and a half years into this job*' [SL2]

4.3   Strategic Leads findings

All of the strategic leads had inherited the VPC portfolio and although extremely supportive, were now dealing with issues that had developed as a result of the initial set up:

> *'but I think we've learned, if we were to start again, there's things that we would get tighter at the beginning....* [SL4]

The challenges faced by the introduction and embedding of a new uniformed youth group into the police varied with one strategic lead stating:

> *'...sometimes you feel like you're making it up as you go along, which of course we are.'* [SL3]

This view was however countered by another strategic lead who stated:

> *'Do I think....we are making it up as we go along..., no because I would have done something to intervene. Am I blind to the fact it could happen, of course it could because we are dealing with children'* [SL2]

All of the strategic leads held positive views of the VPC and appeared committed to the programme. They acknowledged that there was a need for a strategy, supporting governance and resource to support delivery.

> *'I think there's less a risk when you've got such a strong strategy, policy, governance than if you were a force that had none of that.'* [SL2]

'to get a decent cadet provision we need to dedicate a lot of people and resource

in order to achieve it' [SL4]

However, when asked why their police force 'did cadets' or how it fitted with their policing strategy, there was evidence that the strategic leads generally understood the purpose of VPC, but none made specific reference to the National Police Chief Council VPC framework which was agreed in National Police Chief Council (NPCC 2012). No force appeared to have a specific strategy for cadets with regard to strategic direction, numbers or quality of delivery.

Why does your force do VPC	Is there a strategy
because it was another way of really reaching into communities…the principles around diverting young people perhaps from harm.'	*'We have a plan, I wouldn't say we've got a strategic plan…'*
four commitments from the chief, community resilience is a big driver, one of a whole commitment in itself and cadets fall as part of that.	*Part of 'community resilience' plan*
. to expand volunteering, to look to increase engagement with young people of which cadets is a really clear part	*No I don't think it is,.. our strategic plans, but it's certainly is a core part of my portfolio development plan…'*

' but we try to aim our (VPC)… round kids who need help or would benefit from the interaction and care and attention we can bring through the cadets	It is part of a wider volunteer, multi-agency plan
it's around that early intervention and prevention you know building character and resilience amongst young people	'..there's a draft strategy….that was sent to me yesterday.'

Fig. 6 Strategic Lead responses relating to strategy

Since starting VPC, each of the police forces had developed their own governance processes, however there was little direct evidence of a framework in which managers at any level were held accountable for delivery of the VPC to a specific standard. Only one force had attempted this, however it was proving problematic to implement:

'*Well there's a process but it's not being widely used…. the difficulty is that I haven't got the time*' [SL1]

All the police forces covered large geographical areas, with policing responsibility for these areas delegated to the geographical commanders. All strategic leads accepted that these geographical police leaders were under considerable strain in delivering 'policing' with the current demand and reduced resources (National Audit Office, 2018*)*, which made the task of focusing time on the VPC particularly challenging:

'*When you deal with threat, risk and harm it (the VPC) always falls fourth down the list of priorities... I get it and it's the same as for the Chief officers here.*

They absolutely buy into it, but it falls down their list of priorities when the HMIC (Her Majesties Inspectorate of Constabularies) are in to do an inspection on domestic violence' [SL3]

4.3.1 Manging the risk

Across the five forces it was unclear as to whether there was a structured risk management process specifically for the VPC, with one lead stating that the escalation of risk would be part of a larger risk process:

'they'd come up to the strategic risk register if they needed to.' [SL3]

There was significant evidence that the other strategic leads dealt with risk and issues through a series of predominantly semi-formal meeting structures, where risks and issues could be discussed and escalated. Although these were helpful for informally resolving the issues, there was no clear indication that minutes were kept of these meetings with actions logged and reviewed with people held to account for activity. This semi-formal structure tended to be underpinned by trust in the people undertaking the operational support roles:

'I trust senior people to manage this' [SL2]

One issue that did unite the strategic leads was their response to being alerted to significant safeguarding issues in November 2018. The National Police Chief Council, VPC Portfolio Lead, wrote to all Chief Constables following a letter from The

Independent Office of Police Conduct (IPOC) regarding two separate investigations into VPC leaders that it describes as:

'broadly characterised as abuse of position for sexual purpose' (IOPC 2018).

These allegations did not concern the forces that were involved in this research, but all the strategic leads undertook urgent reviews of their safeguarding processes.

It was interesting to note that although the allegations highlighted by the IOPC involved police officers abusing their position 'for sexual purpose', there was evidence that greater trust appeared to be placed in police employees rather than community volunteers:

'It's one of the things that I am reassured about the safeguarding…it's the PCs and the PCSOs that are running those, not Mr. and Mrs. Jones who's an outside volunteer who I don't know much about…I just feel reassured that they are my staff' [SL3]

All but one force, had undertaken some form of review of VPC delivery in the previous 18 months, with several uncovering lax practices including financial management:

'There were subs (subscriptions) being kept in jars and in the local police stations, I mean you know £500, subs for trips and I wasn't comfortable with that. [SL3]

These findings led to several forces developing new police focused processes, however how appropriate, effective or robust these were was difficult to gauge but it had left several of the strategic leads dealing with a lot of low level financial issues:

'I've got an e-mail in my inbox today, can we spend £80 for the cadets to go bowling…that's a drain on me (my time).' [SL3]

4.3.2 Police oversight of the VPC.

There was a general understanding that the administrative and bureaucratic processes within policing did not necessarily make it appropriate to running a uniformed youth group. The bureaucracy of the police *'quite… tight procurement system'* [SL5] was a common frustration with one particular episode bordering on the farcical. A request for warm gloves for the cadets to use while taking part in cold weather volunteering was declined. After an intervention by the strategic lead, gloves were ordered, however they were completely inappropriate and certainly not fit for purpose. It took approximately 18 months and significant effort to finally resolve this one issue.

When the subject of outsourcing or delegating financial and other management responsibilities to others was discussed, the initial reaction from several was negative:

'it reminds me of EastEnders years ago, when Arthur ran off with the Christmas money. [SL1]

However when these issues were discussed in more depth, a more accepting approach was adopted:

'... would need some formal way of auditing the accounts and if that was in place, I would be more comfortable with that.' [SL1]

4.3.3   Other potential operating models

All strategic leads viewed the VPC as a uniformed youth group and could see the benefits of adopting good practice from outside of policing to develop more robust and delegated, volunteer led governance model:

' .... you look at the Scouts and other voluntary (groups)… it's the other way round, in that you do have a resource attached, but it's predominately voluntary, volunteers run.' [SL4]

However it was acknowledged that this shift would take effort:

'...if we could flip that round and have it more from Cadets to scouts,. ...I don't think we're anywhere near that at the moment. [SL3]

4.3.4   Unauthorised activities. – Occupational deviance Loftus (2010)

There was a general acknowledgement that the leaders would be taking part in unauthorised activity to 'get the job' done, however the overwhelming view was that, it was all done with the best intentions.

'...but is there an element of, those really genuinely positive and engaged 'can do' people ...making things work, we can just fix this because we're the cops, I suspect. I'm sure that is happening because it's part of police culture.' [SL2]

4.3.5   Leadership

The strategic leads were all committed to the VPC, however they were not blind to the risk but acknowledged that the processes could be tightened up. There was an underlying view in at least 2 forces that the police were paying 'lip service' to the VPC and very senior leaders needed to demonstrate active leadership.

'sometimes endorsing things on Twitter isn't enough' [SL3]

...There's a veneer over everything that everyone thinks is really beautiful....And then as soon as you start lifting up some stone it is not actually that pretty underneath' [SL1]

More than one strategic lead expressed concerns that they were the driving force behind the VPC, as opposed to VPC being a strategy driven activity that has a clear delivery plan where risks are managed in a safe and consistent manner and they viewed this as a risk to the substantiality of the VPC.

'but if you took me out of the portfolio I'm not sure....I wonder sometimes if it's me that's holding this together' [SL3]

Lastly there was a general acknowledgement that investment was needed.

'You know if we're going to do it properly, we need to invest money and time.'

[SL4]

4. 4   Operational Leads findings

4.4.1   Summary of Operational leads interviews

The five operational leads were a mixture of police officers, up to the rank of inspector and Community Support officers. Three of the operational leads had been in the full time post for over a year and were deeply imbedded within the VPC, while the two others were relativity new to the role, with the VPC as an additional portfolio to their main responsibilities.

No operational lead was aware of a specific VPC strategic plan, and no evidence was identified that they worked to a structured delivery plan where specific individuals were held to account for delivery;

'they're probably a part of the... delivery plan.....But I've certainly not been party to... "In three year's time, we want to be at this stage with the cadets...".'

[OL5]

The general governance arrangements for all forces is set out in Fig. 7

Force	Strategic plan	Clear Operational delivery plan	Ownership of units	Evidence of structure of accountability

1	No specific plan	No	Geographical with support from HQ	No
2	Not mentioned	No	Independent of local police with support from HQ	No
3	Not published	No	Geographical with support from HQ	No
4	No specific plan	No	Independent of local police with support from HQ	No
5	No	No	Geographical with support	No

Fig. 7 Operational Leads responses relating to governance

The operational leads identified similar governance and management issues to the strategic leads including 'l*ip service'* and a lack of supporting infrastructure from within the force.

> '*I just don't think it's very well supported… If we were running it properly and put in the dedication from headquarters point of view and supported the LPAs (local police areas) in their roles, I think they could be even better.* [OL5]

There was evidence that this lack of a delivery plan, support or accountably led to confusion over roles of the operational leads. Those that had been in role for some time,

51

viewed themselves as a supporting bridge between HQ and the unit leaders and as a result, they often appeared to lack the authority to hold others to account or manage risk correctly.

'its just a matter of push, push, push and see if I can pull some people along with me.... I got to try to prove the point that there is a risk' [OL1]

A sentiment echoed by another operational lead:

'... I have to stay on their good side, it's the only way I can get my work done' [OL2]

The operational leads all acknowledged the importance of local police support and the challenge of attempting to influence geographical leads to support local delivery of the VPC in a consistent manner:

'when you speak to a chief inspector...''I love cadets''... but when operational support is requested , 'no, can't spare him (operational officers)...' [OL1]

Several operational leads identified the lack of support for VPC leaders when it was felt they were being treated unfairly or dismissively by local, lower levels geographical supervisors.

'she (VPC leader) was allowed a cupboard and it had all been turfed out because the sergeant wanted to use it and all her stuff was splattered all over the floors' [OL1]

The operational leads were sympathetic to the pressures that the geographical leads were facing, however this was balanced by a certain degree of scepticism within their responses,

'..the reality is that they don't have time to do these things, or maybe not the willingness' [OL1]

4.4.2 Identifying and dealing with risk

All of the operational leads were aware of the need to identify and mitigate risk, however there was evidence that a significant number did not have the necessary training to manage this process. A specific example was the risk assessment of VPC activity. All operational leads spoke confidently that these processes were in place, however when probed further flaws in the systems became apparent;

R: '*Who can conduct risk assessments?'*

OL2*:*   '*..a leader(who is) competent running the risk assessment...'*

R: Who says they're competent?

OL2*:   That's the question. It's not so much we have a list of qualifications…it's   looking at a risk assessment and thinking does that look like a risk assessment… '*

When asked if VPC leaders understood the risk assessment process:

OL2*:   'No probably not, because I never did…'*

R: And do you think that's a risk..?

OL2*:   'Yes definitely it should be standard, regardless of what unit.'*

The issue of common standards across all VPC to make the management of risk more straight forward and consistent was raised by other operational leads

'but at the minute we're all doing it differently, so you can't compare.' [OL1]

4.4.3 Police processes - *'There are very good police policies.. but are they overcomplicated'* [OL2]

Four of the five operational leads provided examples of police processes hindering the safe and effective delivery of the VPC, from ordering equipment, managing the budgets or arranging activities for the young people, however there was a reluctant acceptance that this was unavoidable when part of a large bureaucratic organisation.

'Yeah. Not on purpose sometimes but yeah' [OL4]

Financial management was a specific issue of concern with all operational leads expressing a view that financial management was important:

'*....they've been told that if there's one thing that'll get you (VPC leaders) in bother, get you the sack, it's having a load of money in your drawer that you've not booked in.'* [OL4]

Despite this understanding of the risks, all operational leads place a significant reliance on the 'finance department' to oversee the financial processes and accompanying risk:

'it's not something we really think about, we just automatically trust our guys running our units because they are police officers or police staff' [OL2]

4.4.4 Reporting of risk

All police forces had processes for officers and staff to report risk via either a Health and Safety near-miss form, child protection reporting processes or a confidential 'wrong-doing' telephone line. Evidence suggests that the child protection processes were used rigorously, while other issues were resolved locally. When asked how issues were identified and learning shared, one operational lead replied:

'At the moment probably pretty badly'

While another commented:

'*...they'll probably just go under the radar.... until someone did flag it up or something happened*. [OL2]

When it came to the confidential reporting of concerns by cadets, parents or other concerned adults, it would appear that little thought had been given to this issue.

'(there is)..no reporting process for young people or parents' [OL5]

4.4.5   Soft policing

There was a general acceptance that the VPC was viewed as' soft' policing by all operational leads:

> *'police officers will definitely see it as soft option, babysitting ...should be doing real police work.'* [OL4]

> *.... the sergeants inspectors... they're just like no, we've got more important things to be doing than going out and playing with cadets for a couple of hours'.* [OL2]

4.4.6   Unauthorised activity – Occupational deviance Loftus (2010)

All of the operational leads had a general acceptance that a certain amount of 'unauthorised activity' or 'short cuts' were being taken by leaders in most forces, however there was a view that it was never done for personal gain, but as one leader stated:

> 'to *get the job done'* [OL5]

With several operational leads citing examples of potential unauthorised activities:

> '*I bet they run units on their own, ... bet they give the odd lift (to a young person on their own), Money, there probably quite tight with, but I bet there's*

the odd time where they think well, I'm not taking that because I'm spending

the next week…. Yeah because it's easier.' [OL4)

OL5: *'Yes I think they probably have done in certain aspects. I know (local*

unit) have gone 'ways and means' (working outside of authorised processes)

with some I.T. equipment, because they weren't allowed things so they were

trying to do other bits... [OL5]

As to why these unauthored activities would be taking place one operational lead
explained:

… I think it's probably built through frustration at the fact they haven't got the

correct support.' [OL5]

4.4.7   Potential alternative operating models.

There was a general acceptance and frustration that the current operating frameworks
were not suitable for the long-term management of a volunteer uniformed youth group
and a strong desire for shared, VPC specific National standards:

'if there was a national framework of what we should do….I think it could be a

lot easier and a lot more workable' [OL2]

OL2 '*if we are a uniformed youth group 'police processes don't always fit into that'*

When asked if there were opportunities to learn from the other uniformed youth groups in the UK one leader replied:

'*Oh god, I would hope so'.* [OL1]

This was reinforced by the operational leads' view that senior police officers would be open to suggestions of new operating models which more closely reflected other uniformed youth groups.

'*I think they would be happy to do it now.. they just want rid of it*' [OL4]

'*I think people would be pleased, if it was going to take work away from them*' [OL5]

The balance between operating a uniformed youth group in an 'overstretched' operational policing environment was viewed as a significance concern to the long term sustainably of the VPC:

... my (boss) wouldn't be averse to the cadets not being here. Because they feel.... we're not in the position to do it properly, we're causing a lot of stress down onto the LPAs who aren't able to resource it properly". [OL5]

4.5   The VPC leaders findings

4.5.1   Overview

There was significant evidence that the issues identified during the strategic and operational lead interviews were affecting the ability of the leaders to identify and manage risk when delivering the VPC in a safe manner.

The overall view of the researcher was that the leaders were a committed group of people who were trying their best to deliver the VPC, in what they viewed as difficult circumstances. However, there was strong and clear evidence that the safety and well-being of the young people was upper most in their minds.

> *'safeguarding, that is paramount that everyone sticks to'* [L4.1]

However, almost all leaders felt a frustration at the current operating model with one leader summing it up as:

> *'There is no clear strategy involved around this whole thing. Nothing at all is clear. The finances, the curriculum. It is all grey... because the leadership structure is not there....(leaders) locally, create their own leadership structure ...because they crave structure.'* [L5.2]

Several leaders expressed the views that they felt that they were delivering VPC despite the police:

> *'If HQ blew up tomorrow, that does not affect our unit in any way. We will turn up on (cadet night) as is normal'* [L3.1]

Another general frustration raised by the leaders was the lack of structured police support, which varied from being dismissive:

> *'...particularly sergeants, keep those cadets away from me… do whatever you want with those cadets as long as you keep them away from me.* [L4.3]

To a position where they were resigned to the fact that there was no point in asking for support:

> *'They don't care, they've got too much to do…. but generally, don't care about it'* [L3.1]

4.5.2   Soft policing

The issue of the work with the VPC being viewed as soft policing was evident across all interviews with one leader stating;

> *Me, personally I get a lot of stick for doing it (VPC), granted it's just banter and joking…but it's still kind of they're like…'* [L5.9]

> *'Oh are you going out to shout at the kids again, when are you going to do some real work?.* [L5.3]

4.5.3   Unauthorised activity – Occupational deviance Loftus (2010)

Low level unofficial practices seemed to be widespread with a significant number of leaders admitting to running VPC activity without sufficient staff.:

> *' I've done it for one night, yeah. We've all done probably.'* [L4.3]

As the interviews progressed, there was at times, a realisation from the leaders that they were carrying considerable risk with this behaviour.

> '*suppose at times we're leaving ourselves wide open.*' [L4.1**]**

This point was developed by some of the younger volunteer leaders who were still to set out on their careers as they were concerned that an allegation of wrongdoing could affect their opportunities.

> *'Especially because we have not started careers yet... how would that (allegation of wrongdoing) affect us'* [L4.9]

4.5.4   Finding from analysis of the data collected from the group interviews

As this was an inductive, exploratory research process with the aims gaining a deeper understanding of how processes were affecting the safe delivery of the VPC, it was

decided that a more in-depth approach would be taken to the data analysis of the issues

that arose during the leaders' group interviews.

The initial coding of statements made during the interviews resulted in a total of 933

data points which were aligned to 16 coding points with the results shown in Fig. 8.

Initial coding categories	Data points within coding
Police Culture	40
Force governance	131
Attempts at self-governance	21
Positive leadership	7
Lack of leadership	13
Police specific oversight	191
Desire to improve	57
Reluctance to change	0
Lip service	7
Safeguarding	64
Informal practices	53
Confusion over role	53
Frustration	223
Soft policing	38
Negative view of volunteers	12
Positive view of volunteers	23

Total	933

Fig.8. Initial coding of Leader interviews

Aware that there could be bias to highlighting only negative aspects of the current position faced by the leaders, the term 'positive leadership' was included in the list of codes. This aimed to capture statements where the VPC leaders felt clear leadership had been demonstrated by police management is support of the VPC. Of the 933 statements made, only 7 related to positive leadership from the police, while 13 related to a lack of leadership.

Another initial finding of note was the complete lack of any 'reluctance to change' against a total of 51 statements made relating to a 'desire to improve'

Secondary and supplementary codes of leader's responses

Following the initial codes above, a new set of codes were established as set out in Fig. 4 (chapter 3) and analysis of the finding conducted. The results of these findings are set out in Fig. 9.

13 Codes results

Code	Approximate value
local ill informed decisions	~32
We hold risk	~30
s/guarding	~163
adult training	~75
police culture recognised	~12
Unauthorized activities	~83
Frustration at process	~335
lack of clarity of roles	~207
Resource people	~123
be part of national	~20
recognised standards	~315
Lack of local support	~90
lack of HQ support	~73

Fig, 9. Results of mapping responses to 13 identified codes

Following a review of this coding, two of the codes were removed as it was considered that the 'police culture recognised' and 'we (the leaders) hold the risk' were a realisation of the situation that the leaders found themselves, rather than a contributing factor to the issues they were facing. All data points within these codes were them reviewed and transferred into the most appropriate remaining code. The new results are set out in Fig. 10

11 codes results

Category	
local ill informed decision	
S/guarding	
adult training	
Unauthorized activities	
Frustration at process	
lack of clarity of roles	
Resource people	
be part of national	
lack of recognised standards	
Lack of local support	
lack of HQ support	

Fig 10. **Results of mapping responses to 11 identified codes**

The last review of the data saw the removal of 2 further codes, 'local ill-informed decisions' and 'be part of National (programme)' due to low occurrence rate and it was felt that the views expressed could be assimilated into other codes. As before the data points within these codes were allocated to the most appropriate remaining codes and the results set out in Fig. 11.

Fig 11.   **Results of mapping responses to 9 identified codes**

At the end of this process it became clear that the main issues faced by the leaders who were interviewed was frustration at the current situation they faced when delivering the VPC (359 data points; up from initial 336), followed by a lack of recognised standards (342 data points; up from initial 315) and lack of clarity of roles (244 data points; up from initial 208) . One leader summed up the situation that was leading to the frustration, a sentiment echoed by many others;

> *'Give us a 101 guide to what it is (VPC)* [L4.6]

4.6   Comparison with the police failings in the Laming Report (2002)

After completing the last coding exercise for the leaders, the process of coding was undertaken in relation to the identified police failings within the Laming Report (2202) with the rules set out in fig. 5 in chapter 3.

Identified police failings - Laming Report 2002

Category	Value
S/guarding	~2
adult training	~13
Unauthorized activities	0
Frustration at process	~32
lack of clarity of roles	~19
Resource people	~11
lack of recognised standards	~34
Lack of local support	~38
lack of HQ support	~29

Fig. 12 Mapping of identified failing in Laming Report (2002)

Although the Laming report was a historical review and dealt with another area of policing and young people, the results of the coding exercise would suggest that many of the issues identified by Lord Laming are reflected in the views of leaders who were interviewed. Specifically in relation to the lack of recognised standards, lack of clarity of roles and frustration at the situation. It should be remembered that the failing identified in the Laming Report (2002) lead to the death of Victoria Climbie.

Chapter 5   Discussion and conclusions

5.1   Introduction

This chapter will review the finding of this research in relation to the specific aims and objects as set out. It will restate these aims and then discuss the findings in relation to each of four stated objectives that were set out to support the two aims. In relation to the supporting objectives and where it is felt appropriate these will be broken down into their constituent parts and discussed.

A discussion relating to the implications of the findings for the VPC will be set out and potential way forward will be outlined before concluding with an outline of the limitations of the research.

5.2   The stated aims and objectives of the research:

The specific aims of this research were:

- To identity the current issues faced in delivering the VPC

- Seek to identify if the current delivery model of the VPC could be leading to the onset of the incubation period of disaster (Turner, 1978)

And the objectives that supported the aims were:

- Explore the views expressed by VPC leaders and structural issues identified by DeMarco et al (2018)
-
- To identify if police processes and culture could be a contributing factor to the identified risks.

- To identify similarities to the situation within the child protection teams in the run up to the death of Victoria Climbie. (Laming report 2002).

- Highlight potential frameworks which could assist in the safe management of

the VPC

5.3 Objective 1: Explore the views expressed by VPC leaders and structural issues identified by DeMarco et al (2018)

In their research DeMarco et all (2108) identified that leaders felt unsupported and the police at all levels need to see the importance of managing the VPC appropriately. Statements made to support these claims by DeMarco et al. are set out and short discussion in relation to the finds are then undertaken.

5.3.1 The VPC offers a '*safe and secure environment'* (Demarco et al. 2018 p. 7)

There was clear evidence throughout the interviews that all participants viewed the safety of the young people in the VPC as of upmost importance:

safeguarding, that is paramount that everyone sticks to' [L4.1]

'So where are we in our maturity, I'd like to think we're safe [SL2]

This was also evidenced with the strong response to the incidents highlighted by the IOPC (2018) regarding VPC leaders abusing their position for a sexual purpose when each of the strategic leads conducted reviews of their safeguarding processes.

However, as to whether the processes discussed within this research could identify situations outside of a high level review, before they became significant issue was not clear. This was highlighted during the discussion regarding risk assessments, when after

an initial positive response regarding the completion of risk assessments, the decision-making process did not appear to be based on any structured rationale.

> *'it's looking at a risk assessment and thinking, does that look like a risk assessment…'* [OL2]

And it was unclear if everyone involved in the process understood the purpose:

> *'No probably not, because I never did…'* [OL2]

5.3.2   The police were *'risk adverse'* and there was significant amount of '*red tape'* (Demarco et al 2018 p. 22).

Within this research there was no evidence uncovered that would suggest that the police were 'risk adverse' in relation to the activities that the young people could undertake as members of the VPC. However, it is suggested that these views could be linked to the 'red tape' statements identified by DeMarco et al. (p.22) and brought on due to a lack of understanding of the purpose of undertaking some police related processes, e.g. risk assessment as has been highlighted above. It is suggested that this is closely linked to the confusion over roles and lack of identified standards (Fig. 11), at an operational delivery level which was a major issues for the leaders.

That is not to say that the police related 'red tape' did not hamper the day to day delivery of the VPC. There were a significant number of examples highlighted by the operational leads and VPC leaders during this research. The situation of trying to issue gloves to cadets that took 18 months and the intervention of the strategic lead to resolve, seeming to sum up the frustration felt by many.

5.3.3 *'…..belief that those already in non-police constable roles (e.g. Police Volunteers, Police and Community Support Officers) were often left to carry units' (DeMarco et al., 2018 p.28)*

This research found little evidence of a correlation between the rank of VPC leader and those that were '*left to carry units'* as suggested by DeMarco et al. The evidence presented in this research, based on the views expressed by the majority of interviewees, would appear to point to a much starker position within policing, where the police are split between those that support the VPC and those that do not. The views and actions of those that do not support the VPC ranged from ambivalence:

> '*do whatever you want with those cadets as long as you keep them away from me.'* [L4.3]

> '*the inspector who was given the job (locally) as part of many of his other jobs, just didn't have the time or inclination to do it….. so it all just falls by the wayside.'* [SL4]

To at times being dismissive:

> '*she (VPC leader) was allowed a cupboard and it had all been turfed out because the sergeant wanted to use it and all her stuff was splattered all over the floors'* [OL1]

5.3.4 The police at the operational and political level need to see the importance of managing and operating cadet units within their local communities' (2108 p. 28)

All of the strategic leads were supportive of the VPC, however none made mention of the VPC aims as agreed by the Chief Constables of England and Wales in 2012 (NPCC 2102) It is suggested that this lack of clarity of purpose of the VPC, led to confusion within the rest of the structure across the forces. All strategic leads had extensive portfolios, with the VPC being a very small part of their day to day business. All forces had increased the HQ resource over the past 2 years, however it was very hard to gauge whether that had affected the quality of the delivery the VPC.

This may be due to the fact that there was little evidence that anyone at any level had identified what 'good' looked like in relation to delivery of their VPC. As a result there was no identified quality assurance process in place, with only one force having attempting and then abandoning it, as they did not have sufficient resource to implement it properly:

> *'Well there's a process but it's not being widely used…. the difficulty is that I haven't got the time'* [SL1]

All operational leads were keen to support the VPC leaders and make improvements, however the lack of a formal quality assurance process meant that they lacked authority to challenge VPC leaders and hold geographical policing supervisors to account, which had a detrimental effect on their ability to improve standards.

'... I have to stay on their good side, it's the only way I can get my work done' [OL2]

Within this research, it is considered that this lack of a quality assurance process and therefor lack of accountably, is a fundamental flaw in the current VPC governance processes in the participating forces. Ait results in nobody knowing what is expected of them and there is nowhere to turn when others do not fulfil their commitments in support of the VPC. One VPC leader summed up the situation as:

'Give us a 101 guide to what it is (VPC) [L4.6]

5.3.5 *'Without endorsement (from management), many (Leaders)… perceived the sustainability of units to be under threat'* (DeMarco et al., 2108 p. 28).

The evidence within this research would support the statements made to DeMarco et al (2018) as there was clear evidence throughout the interviews that many of the participants believed that many managers and strategic police leaders were paying 'lip service' to the VPC:

'sometimes endorsing things on Twitter isn't enough' [SL3]

It is suggested that this lack of endorsement from senior leaders, clear structures and purpose for the VPC is permitting geographical leaders to exert their discretion as to whether they support their local VPC. At a time of reduced budgets and increased demands, this could play a part a significant role in the future sustainably of the VPC. This was reinforced by one participant who stated:

... my (boss) wouldn't be averse to the cadets not being here. Because they feel….

we're not in the position to do it properly, we're causing a lot of stress down onto the

LPAs who aren't able to resource it properly". [OL5]

5.4   Objective 2. To identify if police processes and culture could be a contributing factor to the identified risks.

5.4.1   Police Processes

A significant proportion of participants did not believe that the police based processes were suitable for the a voluntary youth organisation. In fact, some leaders expressed an opinion that the police added little in way of value to the delivery of the VPC:

> *'If HQ blew up tomorrow, that does not affect our unit in any way. We will turn up on (cadet night) as is normal'* [L3.1]

There was a general feeling that everyone was muddling along as best they could, but with an underlying feeling of frustration at the current situation, as is highlighted in the finding of the coding exercise into the views of the leaders Fig. 11.

> *'if we are a uniformed youth group, police processes don't always fit into that'* [OL2]

Almost all participants could see the benefits of moving towards an operating model that more closely reflected the other uniformed youth groups. However it is the view of the researcher, based on the evidence from the one police force who attempted to implement the quality assurance framework, that the process of researching, implementing and supporting a change process in the management of the VPC in each

force would not, in the current financial climate be approved by senior leaders. Especially if a significant proportion of the police view the VPC as 'soft' policing.

5.4.2   Police Culture

Three specific areas of police culture were identified to examine in relation to how they may impact on the safe and effective delivery of the VPC , each of which will be discussed in turn

"mission, action, pessimism and cynicism" - Renier (2010)

Although almost all interviewees could relate to these cultural identifiers within the police, none believed that they caused the issues that were faced when delivering the VPC. This was at odds to the expectations of the researcher who, prior to the interviews taking place, believed they would play a significant role. This may be the result of the changing police culture as identified by Paoline (2003), Phillips, Terrell-Orr (2013) who had identified the development or more diverse cultures within policing. Alternatively, it have been present, but the participants were more comfortable framing the situation the police were facing in relation to time constraints and resourcing rather than acknowledging any underlying issues within policing, an issue that is outside of the scope of this research.

5.4.3   'Real' policing v 'soft' policing - Brough, et al (2016) Demarco, et al (2018)

There was significant evidence at all levels that the participants felt the VPC was viewed as 'soft' policing. They believed that when these views were held by local police supervisors who had a role in supporting the local VPC, they had a significant impact

on the ability to deliver the VPC:

…. the sergeants inspectors… they're just like no, we've got more important things to be doing than going out and playing with cadets for a couple of hours'. [OL2]

Several leaders talked of experiences that bordered on bullying from police colleagues for undertaking leader roles in the VPC:

Me, personally I get a lot of stick for doing it (VPC), granted it's just banter and joking…but it's still kind of they're like…' [L5.9]

It is suggested that if the attitudes expressed by the supervisors and the behaviour of colleagues toward those who undertake leadership roles within the VPC is widespread, then it could have a serious long term, detrimental effect on the ability of the police to encourage officers and staff to engage with and support the VPC. In the longer term this will have a significant impact on the sustainability of the VPC.

5.4.4 'Occupational deviance' – Loftus (2010)

All participants accepted that VPC leaders may take short cuts and undertake unauthorised activity as described by Loftus as occupational deviance (2010), however it was not clear if the leaders had every been officially informed of the processes them should adhere to or, the consequences should they operate outside of them. The leaders themselves were candid in their responses and accepted that these shortcuts occurred but only in respect to what could be viewed as 'low level' activity to 'get the job done'

e.g .running VPC events with insufficient leaders.

' I've done it for one night, yeah. We've all done probably.' [L4.3]

More 'serious' issues regarding loose finance management were uncovered during two reviews when strategic leads came into post, but as to how these would be identified on an ongoing basis was of concern:

'*...they'll probably just go under the radar.... until someone did flag it up or something happened.* [OL2]

At no time during the research did any participant explain what was an acceptable level of discretion that the police would permit the leaders to use, which it is suggested caused confusion over roles and specific risk management issues. It would appear reasonable to assume that these issues can be traced back to a lack of training for leaders that was raised as a significant concern by them (Fig. 11). The identification of risk was hampered by a lack of structures that would allow the anonymous reporting of wrongdoing, especially for non-police volunteers, cadets, parents of other concerned adults.

The issues of inadvertently straying out of recognised processes was a particular concern for the younger volunteer leaders who were yet to embark on their careers. It is suggested this puts them in a vulnerable position which should cause concern to all the forces when they have young adults volunteering to support the VPC.

'Especially because we have not started careers yet… how would that (allegation of wrongdoing) affect us' [L4.9]

These finding raise significant risk to the safe and effective delivery of the VPC, including some issues highlighted below:

- The lack of agreed processes may lead to leaders working outside of what the police to believe to be an agreed operating framework, either intentionally or unintentionally.

- The lack of recognised training, places the organisation at risk as it will be unable to provide evidence that the leader knowingly operated outside of process.

- The lack of a recognised confidential wrong doing process could hinder the ability of the organisation to uncover risk and support those that have concerns about unauthorized activity.

5.5 Objective 3- To identify similarities to the situation within the child protection teams in the run up to the death of Victoria Climbie. (Laming report 2002)

When the finding of the final coding of VPC leaders responses is mapped against the finding of the Laming Report (200) there do appear to be striking similarities, especially in relation to the three areas of most concern expressed by the VCP leaders, a frustration

at the current processes, a lack of recognise standards and a lack of recognised roles. It is worth note that within the results of coding of the Laming report, the issues of a lack of local and HQ support were significantly higher than those expressed by the VPC leaders. It is suggested here that this may be due the Laming Report being a historical review of long process with evidence triangulated, as opposed to a snapshot of views on a specific day, and if this research project had been a longitudinal survey, this issue may have become more apparent. None the less the similarities are so stark that it is suggested that it could do no harm for the 5 police forces to review their current operating models.

5.6 Objective 4 Highlight potential frameworks which could assist in the safe management of the VPC.

Within this research, overall structure and processes were identified as a significant challenge that in turn were causing a risk to the safe and effective delivery of the VPC, a situation summed up by one VPC leader:

> *'There is no clear strategy involved around this whole thing. Nothing at all is clear. The finances, the curriculum. It is all grey… because the leadership structure is not there….(leaders) locally, create their own leadership structure …because they crave structure.'* [L5.2]

As previously stated, all other uniformed youth groups in England and Wales operate within the charitable sector and as such, must abide by Charity Commission regulations. All the group will have well established operating models which could be examined and forces could then start to map their activity against identified good practice, similar

to the NCVO trusted charity framework that covers all aspects of governance and operating process and principles to ensure charity act with due diligence.

5.7 Limitations of the research

This research took an exploratory, inductive approach, described by Collis & Hussey as ; '*theory is developed from the observation of empirical reality'* (2014, p 7.) and the semi structured interviewed proved effective at eliciting the views of the participants. But as in all research the voices of those who did not take part were not heard.

The researcher believes the choice of 5 forces allowed a mixed view of voices to be heard, Saunders et al (2007, p. 211), however there were limitation in the number of leaders who could participate. All interviews were conducted at police headquarters during office hours which immediately makes it more difficult for non-police volunteers to attend. In addition, the large geographical spread of the police forces made it difficult for VPC leaders to attend a central location. However on balance, it is felt that set within the limitations of this research a honest attempt was made to ensure a sample of voices were heard.

5.6 Conclusions

5.6.1 Specific aims of the research

This research had 2 specific aims

- To identity the current issues faced in delivering the VPC

- Seek to identify if the current delivery model of the VPC could be leading to the onset of the incubation period of disaster (Turner, 1978)

In relation to the first aim, it is felt that the findings of this research have gone some way to identifying the issues that are faced by several levels of the police forces when delivering the VPC. It has identified a common lack of structure and set of shared concerns that the leaders feel they are facing, namely a frustration at the current operating model which it is suggested is caused by the lack of clarity of structure and roles .Fig 11.

In relation to the second findings, when the evidence is reviewed, it could be construed that the VPC in the 5 police forces could quite quickly enter the' incubation period of a disasters' as set out by Turner (1978). The reasons for this conclusion are; there is an obvious deviation from the '*notionally normal starting point*' in that no strategic lead made mention of the stated aims of the VPC as set out in 2012 (NPCC). There was no identified 'associated precautionary norms' i.e. codes of practice or other rules, due to the fact that there was no clear indication of what 'good' looked like and therefor it was not possible to identify if it was safe.

The situation the VCP finds itself in does bear a striking resemblance to the finding of the Laming report where with hindsight, the child protection teams, were operating in the incubation period, which did lead to a disaster with the death of Victoria Climbie,

6   Recommendations resulting from the research

6.1 Recommendation relating to future delivery of the VPC

If the police are to continue to deliver and develop the VPC, then it is suggested that a review of the current operating model is required to ensure that longer term

complacency does not allow risks to incubate, unnoticed and ensure that those who are delivering the VPC are aware of what is expected of them within the framework they operate in.

With this in mind the following recommendations are made

1. That the Chief Constables publicly restate their full support for the VPC in their force areas, clearly articulating the aims of the VPC as agreed in 2012.

2. That a governance board is convened to oversee a review of the current operating model and any potential change process

3. That a strategic risk assessment is carried out to identify, classify and mitigate current known risks.

4. Engagement begins to scope industry standard good practice and share good practice between units and forces,

5. A joint operating model is developed across all forces

6. Each force should develop a strategic plan and supporting delivery plan which should be overseen by the governance board.

7. A England and Wales wide, quality assurance framework is developed and resourced to ensure compliance with agreed standards.

6.2 Potential future research in this area.

It is hoped that this research will add to the body of evidence that others have contributed to in this area; Demarco (2015), Demarco et al 2018 and Pepper. & Silvestri (2016). This area is still relatively unresearched and there still many areas that would benefit from further investigation.

Although this research highlighted issues in the delivery of the VPC across 5 police forces ,the sample size of leaders was relatively small. This resulted from the research being undertaken during office hours at HQ, which precluded volunteers who work during the day from taking part. A more detailed examination of the views of these non- police volunteers who support the police to deliver the VPC may prove useful as would a longitudinal study into the delivery at a VPC level.

6.3   Final remarks.

The VPC is still relatively new to policing and with the support of Chief Constables and Police and Crime Commissioners, it has grown quickly. It is suggested that it is now at a stage of maturity where it requires a new approach to the governance frameworks that support it. If it is to thrive, then it should now move from being driven by committed individuals to becoming a process driven programme, supported by strong governance, clear structures and led by the top of the organisation.

The current position was summed up by one strategic leader, who typified a common held belief of many involved in the VPC, but has long term implications to the sustainably of the VPC:

>   *'but if you took me out of the portfolio I'm not sure….I wonder sometimes if it's me that's holding this together'* [SL3]

References

All Party Parliamentary Group For Children UK (2014) "*It's all about trust*":
Building good relationships between children and the police" Report of the inquiry
held by the All Party Parliamentary Group for Children 2013-2014. Retrieved from
https://www.ncb.org.uk/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/Policy_docs/appgc_chil
dren_and_police_report_-_final.pdf

Association of Chief Police Officers (2012) Minutes of the ACPO Cabinet meeting
held on Wednesday, 5 December 2012, London. Retrieved from
http://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/CCCabinet%20minutes/2012/20121205cabinet
minutes.pdf

Banton, M. (1964) *Policeman in the Community*. London: Tavistock Publications.

Bowling, B. & Sheptyckib, J (2015). *Global policing and transnational rule with law.*
Transnational Legal Theory, 2015 Vol. 6, No. 1, 141–173.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20414005.2015.1042235

Britton, I., Barnard, E (2016). *Citizens in Policing – A new paradigm of direct citizen
involvement*: A paper presented to the 'Justice and Penal Reform: Re-shaping the
penal landscape' conference, Keble College, Oxford, 16-18th March 2016 Retrieved
from http://www.ipscj.org/our-work/publications/

Brynan, A. (2016) *Social Research Methods* (5th Ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brough P., Chataway, S., Biggs, A. (2016) **'***You don't want people knowing you're a copper!' A contemporary assessment of police organisational culture.* International Journal of Police Science & Management2016, Vol. 18(1) 28–36

https://doi.org/10.1177/1461355716638361

Bullock , K (2017). Shoring up the 'home guard'? Reflections on the development and deployment of police support volunteer programmes in England and Wales *POLICING AND SOCIETY*, 27(4), 341–357.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2015.1058378

Burrell, G., Morgan, G. (1979). *Sociological paradigm and organisational analysis: Elements of the sociology of corporate life*. London, UK: Heinemann.

Cain, M., 1973. *Society and the policeman's role*. London: Routledge.

Chan, J. (2003) *Changing police culture : policing in a multicultural society.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Charity Commission UK (n.d.). *Prepare your annual return.* Retrieved from

https://www.gov.uk/guidance/prepare-a-charity-annual-return#what-a-charity-annual-return-includes

Cockcroft, T. (2013) *Police Culture : Themes and Concepts.* Retrieved from

http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat01619a&AN=up.1154822&site=eds-live

Collis, J. & Hussey, R. (2014) *Business Research, a practical guide for undergraduate and postgraduate students*. London: Palgrave

Callender, M. Pepper, M., Cahalin, K. & Britton, I. (2018). Exploring the police support volunteer experience: findings from a national survey. *Police and Society. An international journal of research and policy.* DOI:10.1080/10439463.2018.1432613

Collis, J. & Hussey, R. (2014) *Business Research, a practical guide for undergraduate and postgraduate students*. London: Palgrave

DeMarco, J. (2015) '*Keep your friends close and your enemies closer: A mixed methods study on adolescent-police interactions and trust in London'* A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of London. Retrieved from

https://pure.royalholloway.ac.uk/portal/files/25583461/DeMarco_JN_2015_PhD_Final_Repository_Version.pdf

DeMarco, J., Bifulco, A., Davidson, J. (2018) *Volunteer Police Cadets: Expansion, digitalisation and impact.* (The Centre for Abuse and Trauma Studies, study). London: Middlsex University.

https://catsresearch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Volunteer_Police_Cadets_final_project_report.pdf

Girl Guiding (UK) (n.d.) *Adult Volunteers*, retrieved on 29.03.19 from

https://www.girlguiding.org.uk/get-involved/become-a-volunteer/

Her Majesty's Inspectors Constabularies & Fire and Rescue Services (n.d.). *Most Similar Groups*. Retrieved on 23rd July 2018 from

https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/crime-and-policing-comparator/about-the-data/

Holdaway, S., (1983). *Inside the British police: a force at work*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Independent Office for Police Conduct (2018): Letter to Chief Constable to Shaun Sawyer. Retrieved on 02.03.2019 from

https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/news/iopc-calls-safeguarding-checks-volunteer-police-cadet-programmes

Loftus, B. (2010) Police occupational culture: classic themes, altered times. *Policing*

& Society 20(1), 1-20. DOI: 10.1080/10439460903281547

Mayor Office of Policing and Crime (MOPAC) (2017): Volunteer Police Cadets collaboration decision. Retrieved from https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/mayors-office-policing-and-crime-mopac/governance-and-decision-making/mopac-decisions-386

Ministry of Defence, UK (2016) MOD Sponsored Cadets Statistics. Retrieved from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/526131/MOD_sponsored_cadet_forces__statistics_2016.pdf

Myers, M. (2013) *Qualitative Research in Business & Management* (2nd ed.) London: Sage.

National Police Chief Council (2016) *Citizens in Policing Strategy 2016-2019.* Retrieved on 22nd July 2018 from http://www.npcc.police.uk/FOI%202016/CO/18%20Citizens%20in%20Policing%20Strategy%202016%202019%20Redacteddocx.pdf

Nottingham Police and Crime Commissioner, UK (2018) *Budget Report*: https://www.nottinghamshire.pcc.police.uk/Document-Library/Our-Money/2018-2019-Documents/Budget-Report-2018-2019.pdf

Paoline, E., (2003) Taking stock: *Toward a richer understanding of police culture.*

Journal of Criminal Justice 31 (2003) 199– 214. doi:10.1016/S0047-2352(03)00002-3

Pepper, M. & Silvestri, M. (2016) 'It's Like another Family Innit': Building Police–Youth Relations through the Metropolitan Police Service Volunteer Police Cadet Programme. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*, Volume 11*(1)*, pp. 1–13. doi:10.1093/police/paw007

Punch, M., 1979. *Policing the inner city*. London: Macmillan.

Rubinstein, J. (1973). *City police*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.

Reiner, R. (2010) *The Politics of the Police* (4th Ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press

Scott W. Phillips, Amanda Terrell-Orr, (2013) "Attitudes of police supervisors: do volunteers fit into policing?", *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, Vol. 36 Issue: 4, pp.683-701, https://doi.org/10.1108/PIJPSM-10-2012-0102

Saunders, M., Lewis, P. & Thornhill, A. (2007) *Research Methods for Business Students* (7th ed.). Harlow, England: Pearson education.

Scout Association Website (n.d.) *Adult Volunteer Role*s. Retrieved on 29.03.19 from https://www.scouts.org.uk/cse-search/?query=leader+roles+#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=leader%20roles%20&gsc.page=1

Turner, B. & Pidgeon, N. (1997) *Man Made Disasters* (2nd ed.) Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.

UK Parliament (2014) Armed Forces: Cadets: written question - 68087

https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2017-03-15/68087/

Unison Union (2014) *'HOME GUARD' of police Support Volunteers to fill in for police cuts*. Retrieved from

https://www.unison.org.uk/content/uploads/2014/11/TowebUNISON-report-on-Police-Support-Volunteers2.pdf

Volunteer Police Cadets website (2018,) *Cadet demographics*. Retrieved from

https://vpc.police.uk/news-and-events/success-of-volunteer-police-cadets-celebrated-at-house-of-lords/

Westley, W., (1970.) *Violence and the police: a sociological study of law, custom and morality*. Massachusetts: MIT.

Youth United Foundation website. (n.d.) *The Network*. Retrieved on 18.10.18 from

http://yuf.org.uk/the-network/

Appendix 1

Ethical opinion form for Faculty of Business and Law (BAL) taught undergraduate and postgraduate students (except MRes)

Instructions to student

The questions starting on the next page of this form should be completed by the student on relevant dissertation / project units requiring the completion of an ethics form, regardless of whether you are collecting primary or secondary data. Refer to the Guidance Notes that accompany this form and the 'Research ethics – issues to consider' checklist, also to be found as an appendix to the Guidance Notes, for help in completing the form. If you are not collecting primary data or data that are identifiable with individuals, then you still need to complete an ethics form, but only need to answer Qs 1-4, then Q11 and as many of the questions between Qs 12-20 as are relevant in your case. The completed form, and any supporting documentation you intend to issue to participants, should then be passed to the supervisor. If your supervisor is satisfied that your application is capable of review, the usual procedure is that he / she will send it to an appointed independent reviewer to decide whether ethical approval can be supported. The reviewer, in conjunction with the supervisor, is responsible for approving the ethical dimension of your project, although you may be asked to amend your documentation to the satisfaction of the reviewer before a favourable ethical opinion can be granted.

No data collection or recruitment of potential participants must be undertaken before a final version of this form has been approved.

A favourable ethical opinion means that, *as long as you conduct the study in the way that has been agreed*, then you have ethical approval. If you subsequently do something other than what has already been agreed, then you no longer have ethical approval and would face the appropriate penalty. If you need to apply for subsequent changes to your project after having been given initial ethical approval, please fill in an 'Amendment' at the end of this form and reapply via your supervisor.

If, following the completion of the review process, your supervisor and, where relevant, any independent reviewer is unwilling to grant you a favourable ethical opinion, you have a right of appeal to BAL Faculty Ethics Committee. If you wish to exercise this right, your supervisor should email the Faculty Ethics Administrator, stating your name, HEMIS no., the relevant unit and course, and briefly stating the grounds for requesting that BAL Faculty Ethics Committee review the decision. Your supervisor should attach your completed ethics form and any supplementary documentation and include any relevant correspondence about the case.

A final signed and dated version of this form must be included in the file of the dissertation you are required to submit electronically. The form MUST be signed and dated by 1) the student, 2) the supervisor and 3) the peer ethics reviewer (unless the University has specifically previously agreed that the supervisor alone can sign off). If the dissertation is submitted without a fully completed, signed and dated ethics form it will be deemed to be a fail. Second attempt assessment may be permitted by the Board of Examiners.

1.   What are the objectives of the dissertation / research project?

      1 Specific aims of this research are:

- To identity real and perceived risks in the safe delivery of Volunteer Police Cadets (VPC)

- To identify cultural and procedural barriers to change

Objectives to support these aims:

- Critically review research relating to police culture, identifying cross over as to how this impacts on volunteers who support the police.

- Explore the views expressed by VPC leaders identified by DeMarco, Bifulco, Davidson (2108).

- Explore similarities with the police failings identified in Lord Laming's 2002 report into the death of Victoria Climbie.

2.   Does the research involve *NHS patients, resources or staff*? applicable).
      2.1 No

3.   Does the research involve MoD staff?
      3.1 No

4.   Do you intend to collect *primary data* from human subjects or data that are identifiable with individuals? (This includes, for example, questionnaires and interviews.)
      4.1 Yes

5   How will the primary data contribute to the objectives of the dissertation / research project?

5.1 Semi structured interviews will be conducted with strategic leads and operational managers from selected police forces along with workshops with the VPC leaders, with a view to gaining and understanding of how the real and perceived risk are currently managed within their police force.

5.2 The results of these interviews and workshops may or may not demonstrate that 'police culture' plays a role in the current management arrangements

5.3 As a result of the interviews and workshops, a critical review of the data may identify barriers to reducing the risk by considering alternative operating models, which could reduce the risk when running a uniformed youth group.

6. What is/are the *survey population(s)*?

6.1 There are 43 police forces in England and Wales, all with an identified strategic lead for their force's VPC. Each force then has a staff member who has responsibility for the operational delivery of their VPC and there then approximately 2,000 leaders across the 43 police officers who deliver the VPC on a regular basis.

7. a) How big is the *sample* for each of the survey populations, and b) how was this sample arrived at? (Please answer *both* parts of this question.)

7.1 The 43 Police forces in England and Wales are grouped by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabularies and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) into "most similar groups' (MSG) based on socio economic and crime factors. However each force has it's own unique SMG, and it does not necessary follow that if Dorset appear in Norfolk's SMG, the Norfolk with feature in Dorset's SMG. The six forces identified for this study will ensure that all but 3 police forces will be represented somewhere with the SMG grouping of the 6 chose forces. This should ensure that cross section of views are obtained.

7.2 From each of the 6 forces, a strategic lead and operational lead will be invited to take part in semi structured interviews

7.3 A group of between 6 and 12 VPC leaders from each fore will be invited to take part in focus groups

7.4 It is felt that this cross section of views from strategic an operational leads along with the leaders will ensure a suitable The above numbers should afford an opportunity to obtain a cross section of views, both with regards to geography, forces size and issues faced.

8. How will respondents be a) *identified* and b) *recruited*? (Please answer *both* parts of this question.)

8.1 The agreement of the Chief Constable for Devon and Cornwall, who holds the National VPC portfolio will be sought to approach between 6 Chief Constables to obtain authority to undertake the research.

8.2   Once agree has been given an approach will be made to the appropriate Chief Constable seeking their approval to approach their staff to take part in the research. Draft letter attached.

8.3   Once agreement to proceed has been obtained, a letter of introduction will be sent to   the appropriate strategic lead, outlining the research project and   seeking their support, not just to participate, but also to support an approach to their staff and leaders. Draft letter attached.

8.4   Once agreement has been obtained from the Assistant Chief Constable, an email of introduction will be sent to the operational lead, seeking their support to participate in the research and requesting their assistance to circulate an email of introduction to all their VPC leaders. Draft letter attached

8.5   The researcher will collate details of all potential participants and should a workshop be over subscribed then a screening process will be undertaken to ensure a mixture of police officers, staff, adult volunteers are included in the workshop group. It is difficult to gauge the potential uptake for the workshops but the aim will be to ensure a cross section of views are included. Draft letter attached

9.   What steps are proposed to ensure that the requirements of *informed consent* will be met for those taking part in the research? If an Information Sheet for participants is to be used, please attach it to this form. If not, please explain how you will be able to demonstrate that informed consent has been gained from participants.

9.1   All letters of introduction will outline the purpose of the research and how it will be used and make the issue of informed consent explicit with in it, as will the supporting information sheet, both of which are attached. This will be reiterated at the start and end of each session and each participant will asked to sign the consent form to confirm they understand 'informed consent'.

10.   How will *data* be *collected* from each of the sample groups?

10.1   If possible all interviews with strategic and operational lead officers will be conducted face to face, however if this is not possible a telephone interview will take place.

10.2   All focus groups with VPC leaders will be face to face.

10.3   All interviews and focus groups will recorded using a digital recording device.

11.   a) How will *data* be *stored* and b) what will happen to the data at the end of the research? (Please answer *both* parts of this question.)

11.1 All data that is produced will transferred onto and stored within a secure University of Portsmouth (UofP) Google drive account of the researcher.

11.2 No data will be shared with other persons or organisation, except in relation to the   completion of the research.

11.3 At the conclusion of the research de-personalised data will be retained for 10 years in line with the UofP policy.

11.4 All paper copies of letters and permission forms will be scanned onto the secure IT system and the original paper copied will be destroyed.

11.5 All digital audio recording will be uploaded onto the University of Portsmouth Google drive system and the originals will be deleted.

11.6 All recordings and data from this research will be retained and disposed of in-line with the University of Portsmouth regulations.

12.   What measures will be taken to prevent unauthorised persons gaining access to the data, and especially to data that may be attributed to identifiable individuals?

12.1 All data that is gathered will be stored on the UofP Google drive system with all documents being password protected.

12.3 All physical data will be stored in a secure cabinet in a locked office until it can be uploaded onto the Google secure IT system. Only the researcher has access to the cabinet.

13.   What steps are proposed to safeguard the *anonymity* of the respondents?

13.1 A master list of all participants will be retained on a password protected document, with each participant receiving a unique reference number. This unique reference will be used in all other documentation.

13.2 The only time that 'special category data' may be requested is if the focus groups become over subscribed and limited data regarding the sex of participants will be sought. In these circumstances this information will be stored in the same manner as all other data, however the issues of sex of the participant will not be mentioned in any findings.

14.   Are there any *risks* (physical or other, including reputational) *to respondents* that may result from taking part in this research?   YES.

14.1 There could be a perceived professional risk to the VPC leaders who take part in the workshops. The police are a hierarchical organisation and participating leaders may be reticent to express their views, fearing that their

views may be disclosed to their senior officers, thereby affecting their professional lives.

Mitigation

Confidentially issues will be dealt in the information sheet and letters of introduction. This will be reinforced in the informed consent form prior to interviews and workshops which each participant will be asked to sign to confirm their understanding.

15. Are there any *risks* (physical or other, including reputational) *to the researcher or to the University* that may result from conducting this research?

No.

16. Will any *data* be *obtained from a company or* other *organisation*?

No.

17. What steps are proposed to ensure that the requirements of *informed consent* will be met for any organisation in which data will be gathered? How will *confidentiality* be assured for the organisation?

17.1 The authority of Chief Constable Shaun Sawyer the National portfolio lead for Volunteer   Police Cadets has been obtained to undertake this research and each Chief Constable of   the participating force will be contacted to seek their informed consent for the research to take place within their force.

18. Does the organisation have its own ethics procedure relating to the research you intend to carry out? Yes

19. Will the proposed research involve any of the following (please put a √ next to 'yes' or 'no'; consult your supervisor if you are unsure):

• Potentially vulnerable groups (e.g. adults unable to consent, children)?	YES		NO	X
• Particularly sensitive topics?	YES		NO	X
• Access to respondents via 'gatekeepers'?	YES	X	NO	

• Use of deception?	YES		NO	X
• Access to confidential personal data (names, addresses, etc)?	YES		NO	X
• Psychological stress, anxiety, etc.?	YES		NO	X
• Intrusive interventions?	YES		NO	X

If answers to any of the above are "YES", please explain below how you intend to minimise the associated risks.

As set out in section 8 above the normal command structures within the police forces will be used.

20.   Are there any other ethical issues that may arise from the proposed research?

No.

	Print name	Signature	Date signed
Student	Ed Sherry		06/12/18

I / we grant a favourable ethical opinion:

	Print name	Signature	Date signed
Supervisor	Sara Hadleigh-Dunn		05/12/18
Peer reviewer (unless University has agreed that supervisor can sign off)	Kathryn Buttriss		5th Dec 2018

AMENDMENTS

If you need to make changes please ensure you have permission before recruiting any participants and any primary data collection. If there are major changes, fill in a new form if that will make it easier for everyone. If there are minor changes then fill in the amendments (next page) and get them signed before the primary data collection begins.

The Home Office: Police 'Most Similar Groups' (MSG)

Avon & Somerset	**Bedfordshire**	**Cambridgeshire**	**Cheshire**
Staffordshire	Leicestershire	Warwickshire	Northamptonshire
Derbyshire	Nottinghamshire	Thames Valley	Derbyshire
Essex	Hertfordshire	Gloucestershire	Staffordshire
Hampshire	Kent	Wiltshire	Wiltshire
Hertfordshire	Hampshire	Avon & Somerset	Devon & Cornwall
Kent	Essex	Staffordshire	Avon & Somerset
Sussex	South Yorkshire	Devon & Cornwall	Suffolk

City of London	**Cleveland**	**Cumbria**	**Derbyshire**
City of London do not have an MSG due to the unique nature of the force			
	Merseyside	Lincolnshire	Staffordshire
	Northumbria	Norfolk	Avon & Somerset
	Greater Manchester	North Wales	Cheshire
	West Yorkshire		Northamptonshire
	Humberside		Essex
			Kent
			Wiltshire

Devon & Cornwall	**Dorset**	**Durham**	**Dyfed Powys**
Wiltshire	Surrey	Gwent	Lincolnshire
Suffolk	Cambridgeshire	Humberside	Cumbria
Warwickshire	Gloucestershire	South Wales	Norfolk
North Wales	Thames Valley	Northamptonshire	
West Mercia	Warwickshire		
Norfolk	Sussex		
North Yorkshire	West Mercia		

Essex	**Gloucestershire**	**Greater Manchester**	**Gwent**
Hertfordshire	West Mercia	West Midlands	Humberside
Avon & Somerset	Warwickshire	Merseyside	Durham
Hampshire	North Yorkshire	West Yorkshire	South Wales
Staffordshire	Cambridgeshire	Cleveland	Lancashire
Leicestershire	Wiltshire	Northumbria	Northumbria
Sussex	Devon & Cornwall	South Yorkshire	Northamptonshire

Derbyshire	Suffolk	South Wales	South Yorkshire

Hampshire	**Hertfordshire**	**Humberside**	**Kent**
Hertfordshire	Hampshire	Gwent	Nottinghamshire
Sussex	Essex	South Wales	Essex
Essex	Leicestershire	Lancashire	Staffordshire
Leicestershire	Sussex	Northumbria	Avon & Somerset
Thames Valley	Avon & Somerset	Durham	Northamptonshire
Avon & Somerset	Staffordshire	South Yorkshire	Derbyshire
Staffordshire	Thames Valley	West Yorkshire	Hertfordshire

Lancashire	**Leicestershire**	**Lincolnshire**	**Merseyside**
South Wales	Hertfordshire	Norfolk	Cleveland
South Yorkshire	Hampshire	North Yorkshire	Greater Manchester
Northumbria	Sussex	North Wales	West Midlands
Nottinghamshire	Essex	West Mercia	Northumbria
Humberside	Bedfordshire	Suffolk	West Yorkshire
Kent	Nottinghamshire	Devon & Cornwall	South Yorkshire
West Yorkshire	Kent	Cumbria	

Metropolitan Police	**Norfolk**	**North Wales**	**North Yorkshire**
West Midlands	North Wales	Suffolk	West Mercia
Greater Manchester	Suffolk	Norfolk	Norfolk
West Yorkshire	North Yorkshire	Devon & Cornwall	Gloucestershire
	West Mercia	Wiltshire	Lincolnshire
	Devon & Cornwall	West Mercia	Suffolk
	Lincolnshire	Warwickshire	North Wales
	Wiltshire	North Yorkshire	Devon & Cornwall

Northamptonshire	**Northumbria**	**Nottinghamshire**	**South Wales**
Cheshire	South Wales	Kent	Lancashire
Derbyshire	West Yorkshire	Bedfordshire	Northumbria
Staffordshire	Lancashire	Lancashire	Humberside
Kent	South Yorkshire	Essex	South Yorkshire
Avon & Somerset	Humberside	South Yorkshire	Gwent
Essex	Gwent	Leicestershire	West Yorkshire
Nottinghamshire	Cleveland	Hertfordshire	Nottinghamshire

South Yorkshire	**Staffordshire**	**Suffolk**	**Surrey**
West Yorkshire	Avon & Somerset	Devon & Cornwall	Dorset
Lancashire	Derbyshire	North Wales	Thames Valley
Northumbria	Essex	Wiltshire	Cambridgeshire
South Wales	Hampshire	Norfolk	

Nottinghamshire Bedfordshire Kent	Hertfordshire Northamptonshire Cheshire	Warwickshire West Mercia North Yorkshire	
Sussex Hampshire Hertfordshire Thames Valley Leicestershire Essex Avon & Somerset Staffordshire	**Thames Valley** Sussex Hampshire Cambridgeshire Hertfordshire Essex Avon & Somerset Leicestershire	**Warwickshire** Wiltshire Devon & Cornwall West Mercia Suffolk Gloucestershire Cambridgeshire North Wales	**West Mercia** North Yorkshire Warwickshire Gloucestershire Suffolk Devon & Cornwall Wiltshire Norfolk
West Midlands Greater Manchester Merseyside West Yorkshire	**West Yorkshire** South Yorkshire Northumbria Lancashire South Wales Greater Manchester Nottinghamshire West Midlands	**Wiltshire** Devon & Cornwall Warwickshire Suffolk North Wales West Mercia Norfolk Cheshire	

Participant Information Sheet

UNIVERSITY OF PORTSMOUTH

Researcher Ed Sherry OBE
07909553012
Supervisor- Dr Sara
Hadleigh-
Dunnsara.hadleigh-

Study Title: Management of the Volunteer Police Cad
REC Ref No: ....

Firstly let me introduce myself. I am the National Volunteer Police Cadets (VPC) Hub Director, working to Chief Constable Shaun Sawyer, the portfolio lead for the VPC. I am currently studying for a self funded MSc in Risk, Crises and Resilience Management at University of Portsmouth and as part of my studies I am undertaking research into the governance and management of VPC units across England and Wales. I would like to invite you to take part in my research study, but before you decide if you would like to participate, I would like you to understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please feel free to talk to others about the study and ask me about anything that is not clear.

What is the purpose of the study?
The aim of my study is to examine the different ways in which the VPC is managed across forces, specifically to:
Identity real and perceived risks resulting from the utilisation of police governance structures to deliver the Volunteer Police Cadets (VPC), a uniformed youth group.
Identify if 'police culture' affects the safe delivery of the VPC
Identify cultural and procedural barriers to changing the current processes
I hope that the findings of my research will assist in shaping the future governance processes of the VPC to ensure that the VPC is as safe as possible for everyone involved and that risks and issues are dealt with in an appropriate and proportionate manner.

Why have I invited you?
As you have a key part to play in the leadership of your VPC, I am seeking your views to help me understand the current and real operating environment of the VPC at a force and local level and your experiences will help to shape my findings.

Do I have to take part?
No, It is up to you to decide to join the study.

What will happen to me if I take part?
I will get in touch with you to arrange the interview or discussion group that will take no longer than 1 hour and take place at a time and location that is suitable to you. It is anticipated that the interviews and discussion groups will take place in early January 2019.

The semi-structured interviews are designed for strategic and operational leads for VPC within a force and the discussion groups are intended for VPC leaders who deliver the VPC on a regular basis. During both activities, I will ask questions to get the

conversation going and have several points to cover, however I am keen to hear your views about the issues you currently face.

The sessions will be recorded on a digital audio recorder, however this recording will kept in a secure location until I can upload it onto a secure IT system.

Expenses and payments

I will reimburse reasonable travel expenses and if you are taking part in the discussion group, light refreshments will be available at no cost.

What will I have to do?

Attend and take an active part in the discussion group or semi-structured interview. The discussion group should take no longer than one hour and the interviews will take no more than 45 minutes.

What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?

You will have to give up one hour of your time.

What are the possible benefits of taking part?

It is anticipated that the findings from this research will assist in setting up a long-term sustainable governance framework to ensure the safe and effective delivery of the VPC. Your honest views will help to shape the future governance structure, which will be based on the experiences of people who understand the VPC. This will have long lasting benefits to everyone involved in the VPC and go a long way to ensuring it's the sustainably.

Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?

Yes, as previously stared, all discussion groups and interviews will be recorded on a digital audio recorder, however this recording will be kept secure by me until it is uploaded to my password protected computer. Once the recording has been uploaded the original will be destroyed. All participants will be given a unique number and your name will not appear on any documents and all quotes will be depersonalised. The only caveat to this is that certain supervisors at my university may obtain access to the data to ensure I have completed my research correctly, however all supervising staff will abide by the university code of ethics in relation to their work.

What will happen if I don't want to carry on with the study?

There is no obligation on you to take part and should you, at any time wish to withdraw your consent, this is possible up until the time when the data has been analysed.

What if there is a problem?

If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you can speak to me or my supervisor and we will do our best to answer your questions. My supervisor is Dr Sara Hadleigh-Dunn and can be contacted at sara.hadleigh-dunn@port.ac.uk.
If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this the University of Portsmouth complaints officer at complaintsadvice@port.ac.uk

What will happen to the results of the research study?
The research will form the basis of my dissertation that is due to be submitted in April 2019. I would be delighted to send you a copy of the dissertation, however I will also prepare a short summary for you outlining my findings that I will circulate to all participants.

In addition I will prepare a briefing note for the National VPC governance board and seek their support to set up a working group to review the finding and discuss any changes to current VPC governance processes that my findings highlight.

Once again, please be assured that you will not be mentioned or identifiable in anything that is produced as a result of taking part in this research.

Who is organising and funding the research?
This research project is being sponsored by the University of Portsmouth where I am undertaking my studies, however I am self-financing my studies. I have not received any financial support from the police but I do have the strategic support of Chief Constable Shaun Sawyer who is the National Police Chief lead for the VPC.

Who has reviewed the study?
My supervisor Dr Hadleigh- Dunn and an independent reviewer have reviewed the proposed research.

Further information and contact details
Participants may want further information. This could be subdivided:-

1. If you would like to know more about this research project please feel free to contact me at ed.sherry@vpc.police.uk or 07909553023.

2. To find out more about the background to the research go to www.vpc.police.uk

3. It is intended that this research will form the basis for discussions to develop a recognised governance structure that will be offered to police forces to improve the quality of the VPC, while supporting the leaders who deliver the VPC in a safe and effective manner.

Concluding statement
Thank you for taking the time to read the background to my research. Should you decide to participate you will be given a copy of the information sheet to keep and I will again seek your consent before we undertake an activity.

- Thank the participant for their time
- Outline purpose of the research and progress to date
- Reiterate the confidentiality clauses
- Reiterate the right not to answer any questions
- Explain right to withdraw
- Outline the outputs
- Offer to provide a summary of the research
- Request to record the interview

1	**Role – describe**
	How long in post
	Volunteer?
	Why VPC for your force
	Personal view of VPC
2	**Strategic plan Y/N**
	Outline governance
	Main issues with delivering VPC / Plan
	Costs - Adequately resourced
	Risk register for the VPC
	How are lessons learnt disseminated
3	**Who owns governance local level**
	Are they as engaged as you would like
	How would you like to see local governance strengthened
	View on volunteers support local governance like school governors or scout groups
	How do you think other would view it
	What safeguards should be in place
	Where would resistance come from
	How is finance managed
4.	**Academic research - un-authorised activity (shortcuts to get the job done),** How would you expect this to be picked up How likely do you think that this activity is taking place scale 1 to 5 How can cadets, parents or leaders report suspecting wrong doing
5.	**Biggest risks faced in delivering the VPC at local level**
	1-5 how confident that local managers could identify the risks

6.	**Soft policing** -What are your views on this statement? leaders? Non VPC Staff?	
7.	**View on alternative governance models from Youth Sector**	
	Barriers?	
	Investment or cost to force	
	Police's uniformed youth group or youth outreach programme or something else altogether	
	Overriding concern about your VPC	
	What would effective governance look like	
	Any other issues	

Appendix 5

VPC leaders interview guide

- Thank the participant for their time
- Outline purpose of the research and progress to date
- Reiterate the confidentiality clauses
- Reiterate the right not to answer any questions
- Explain right to withdraw
- Outline the outputs
- Offer to provide a summary of the research
- Request to record the interview

Introduce yourself - Name unit and role
Volunteer / paid or a bit of both

1. I lead cadets because……

2. Do you know if you force has a strategic plan for your cadets?

3. Who owns cadets e.g. is the local police or force HQ
How does that work for you folks?
Do they know what your risk and issues are?
In an ideal world, how would you like to see it?

4. How are risks managed in your VPC
How do you all learn from each other when something goes wrong?
Is there an overall risk register
How would you raise concerns about issues that you have identified?
How confident would you be in doing this?
Do you think everyone feels confident to do that?

5. finance arrangements within your unit?
How effective are they?
It is recognised that police undertaken unauthorised activity to get the job done…
'Ways and means act'
Who inspects the accounts
How effective

6. I would describe my safeguarding arrangements as…

7. Do you feel that you have adequate training to run cadets and undertake all the roles that are expected of you

8. What are you views on community volunteers helping?

7. How confident would you be at managing volunteers?

8. What would have to be in place?

9. Academic evidence 'soft policing', do you think that exists in your force eg playing with kids
10. What keeps you awake at night